Perverse Reverse Price Competition: Average Wholesale Prices and Medicaid Pharmaceutical Spending by Alpert, Abby et al.
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Business Economics and Public Policy Papers Wharton Faculty Research
2013
Perverse Reverse Price Competition: Average
Wholesale Prices and Medicaid Pharmaceutical
Spending
Abby Alpert
Mark Duggan
University of Pennsylvania
Judith K. Hellerstein
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/bepp_papers
Part of the Business Commons, and the Public Economics Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/bepp_papers/129
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alpert, A., Duggan, M., & Hellerstein, J. K. (2013). Perverse Reverse Price Competition: Average Wholesale Prices and Medicaid
Pharmaceutical Spending. Journal of Public Economics, 108 (C), 44-62. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w19367
Perverse Reverse Price Competition: Average Wholesale Prices and
Medicaid Pharmaceutical Spending
Abstract
Generic drugs comprise an increasing share of total prescriptions dispensed in the U.S., rising from nearly
50% in 1999 to 75% in 2009. The generic drug market has typically been viewed at the wholesale level as a
competitive market with price approaching marginal costs. However, the large presence of third party payers
as final purchasers may distort prices at the retail level relative to what a standard model of price competition
would predict. In this paper, we investigate how generic drug producers compete in the presence of the
procurement rules of the Medicaid program. Medicaid reimbursement to pharmacies, like that of other
payers, is based on a benchmark price called the average wholesale price (AWP). The AWP is reported by
generic producers themselves, and until recently has been subject to essentially no independent verification.
As a result, generic producers have had an incentive to compete for pharmacy market share by reporting
AWPs that exceed actual average wholesale prices, as this “spread” leads to larger pharmacy profits. In 2000,
after a federal government audit of actual wholesale prices of generic products, states were advised to reduce
Medicaid reimbursement by as much as 95% for about 400 generic and off-patent drug products. We use
variation induced by the timing of this policy along with its differential impact on drug products' Medicaid
reimbursement to estimate the impact of this exogenous price change on the market share of targeted
products. Our findings indicate that pharmacies did respond to the perverse incentives of the Medicaid
program by dispensing products with the highest AWPs. Overall, the Medicaid market share fell by about 45%
for targeted drug products as a result of the policy.
Keywords
medicaid, reimbursement policy, prescription drugs, competition
Disciplines
Business | Public Economics
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/bepp_papers/129
Perverse Reverse Price Competition: Average Wholesale 
Prices and Medicaid Pharmaceutical Spending 
 
 
 
Abby Alpert 
University of California, 
Irvine 
aealpert@uci.edu  
Mark Duggan 
Wharton and NBER 
mduggan@wharton.upenn.edu 
Judith K. Hellerstein 
University of Maryland and 
NBER 
hellerst@econ.umd.edu 
 
August 2013 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Generic drugs comprise an increasing share of total prescriptions dispensed in the U.S., rising 
from nearly 50 percent in 1999 to 75 percent in 2009. The generic drug market has typically been 
viewed at the wholesale level as a competitive market with price approaching marginal costs. 
However, the large presence of third party payers as final purchasers may distort prices at the 
retail level relative to what a standard model of price competition would predict. In this paper, 
we investigate how generic drug producers compete in the presence of the procurement rules of 
the Medicaid program. Medicaid reimbursement to pharmacies, like that of other payers, is based 
on a benchmark price called the average wholesale price (AWP). The AWP is reported by 
generic producers themselves, and until recently has been subject to essentially no independent 
verification. As a result, generic producers have had an incentive to compete for pharmacy 
market share by reporting AWPs that exceed actual average wholesale prices, as this “spread” 
leads to larger pharmacy profits. In 2000, after a federal government audit of actual wholesale 
prices of generic products, states were advised to reduce Medicaid reimbursement by as much as 
95% for about 400 generic and off-patent drug products. We use variation induced by the timing 
of this policy along with its differential impact on drug products’ Medicaid reimbursement to 
estimate the impact of this exogenous price change on the market share of targeted products. Our 
findings indicate that pharmacies did respond to the perverse incentives of the Medicaid program 
by dispensing products with the highest AWPs. Overall, the Medicaid market share fell by about 
45% for targeted drug products as a result of the policy. 
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1. Introduction 
Generic drugs comprise an increasing share of total prescriptions dispensed in the U.S., 
rising from nearly 50 percent in 1999 to 75 percent in 2009 (Berndt and Aitken, 2010). The 
generic drug market has typically been viewed at the wholesale level1 as approximately 
competitive, with price approaching marginal costs. Largely as a result of this, the widespread 
availability of generic drugs is generally perceived as extremely beneficial to consumers and to 
those who bear the burden of paying for these treatments. However, at the retail level, generic 
prices may well exceed marginal cost, even by a wide margin. One important aspect of the 
generic drug market that has been largely unexplored is how drug procurement by the 
government and private insurers impacts competition among generic drug manufacturers. In 
particular, procurement rules may distort retail generic drug prices away from marginal cost by 
perversely rewarding higher-priced generics with greater market share. 
The main objective of this paper is to investigate how generic drug manufacturers 
compete in the presence of the procurement rules of the Medicaid program. We examine the 
impact of procurement on competition by evaluating how drug purchasing patterns responded to 
a plausibly exogenous negative price shock generated by a significant government intervention. 
During the period under study, Medicaid accounted for nearly 20% of all prescription drug 
expenditures in the U.S. Thus, distortions in the market for drugs purchased by Medicaid have 
potentially large impacts on overall drug spending, and health care spending more generally. 
How might procurement distort generic competition?  Consider a stylized market without 
procurement. In the absence of government and private insurance, all consumers pay pharmacies 
(or other generic dispensers) in cash for drugs purchased. Consumers are indifferent between 
bioequivalent generic drugs that are produced by one manufacturer versus another2, and thus 
purchase the drug from the pharmacy with the lowest price. In turn, pharmacies stock and 
dispense the version of the generic drug that is least costly, choosing among possibly dozens of 
manufacturers. Competition among generic manufacturers for pharmacy market share, and 
competition among pharmacies for consumers, drives the equilibrium price down to marginal 
cost at both the wholesale and retail levels. 
                                                          
1 Wholesale refers to transactions between manufacturers (or wholesalers) and pharmacies and retail refers to 
transactions between pharmacies and final purchasers (e.g. consumers or insurers). 
2Since generic drugs are regulated to be identical in their chemical structure and strength, a specific manufacturer is 
rarely designated in a physician's written prescription for a generic drug. 
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The actual market for generic drugs differs from this textbook scenario for two main 
reasons. First, there are very few cash-paying consumers in the pharmaceutical market. The last 
few decades have seen a dramatic rise in prescription drug insurance coverage. The fraction of 
drug spending paid for by public and private payers has grown from 34% in 1980 to nearly 80% 
in 2000, and 92% in 2010 (Berndt and Aitken, 2010). Thus cash-paying consumers currently 
account for only 8% of payments. Insured consumers are virtually price insensitive with respect 
to choosing among different manufacturers of a generic drug, since they typically pay a copay 
that is fixed across equivalent generic drugs. Consequently, consumers play little role in generic 
price competition, leaving public and private payers—who account for the lion’s share of 
payments to pharmacies— as the main driving force. 
Second, the largest purchasers of generic drugs—public and private insurers—do not pay 
pharmacies' posted prices. Government and private insurers set their own rules to determine how 
much to reimburse pharmacies for drugs that they dispense. For Medicaid, like other payers, 
reimbursement for each prescription has typically been based on a benchmark price called the 
average wholesale price (AWP),3 which is published in several pricing catalogues. For each 
product, this list price is reported to the catalogues by generic manufacturers themselves, and 
until recent years has been subject to essentially no independent verification of its resemblance to 
the actual average price that pharmacies pay manufacturers to acquire drugs. As a result, generic 
manufacturers have had an incentive to compete for pharmacy market share by reporting AWPs 
that are much greater than average prices actually paid by pharmacies, as higher “spreads” lead 
to larger pharmacy profits. Put another way, since higher AWPs generate higher reimbursement 
for pharmacies, manufacturers might compete to report higher and higher AWPs in order to 
induce pharmacies to stock their drug rather than a competitor's drug. This may partially explain 
why differences between published and actual average prices of more than 1000% have been 
uncovered in recent government audits for some generic drugs. Thus, competition among 
manufacturers may increase rather than reduce the prices on which Medicaid reimbursement is 
based, leading to inflated Medicaid spending.  
                                                          
3 A few states use the Wholesale Acquisition Cost (WAC) or the minimum of the WAC and AWP as their 
reimbursement benchmark. In 2000, the year of the policy intervention we study, Massachusetts and Rhode Island 
were the only two states using the WAC as their primary reimbursement benchmark (National Pharmaceutical 
Council, 2000). 
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To empirically investigate the impact of Medicaid procurement on price competition, we 
examine an intervention that caused a sharp decline in price for a well-defined set of generic 
drugs. In the late 1990s, an investigation by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the National 
Association of Medicaid Fraud Control Units (NAMFCU) “revealed a pattern of 
misrepresentations by some drug manufacturers of the average wholesale prices and wholesale 
acquisition costs of certain of their products.”4  As a result of this audit, in May 2000, states were 
advised to reduce the AWP used to reimburse pharmacies by as much as 95% for approximately 
400 generic and off-patent injectable, infusion, and inhalation drug products. This intervention 
provides a rare opportunity to study price competition because unlike other payment reforms, 
such as the Medicare Modernization Act which lowered prices for all physician-administered 
drugs (which are covered by Medicare Part B), this policy differentially lowered price for only a 
select set of drugs within classes of bioequivalent products.  Thus we can compare changes in 
pharmacy purchases before and after the price change for targeted generic drugs and their 
bioequivalent competitors to estimate pharmacy demand responses and infer manufacturers’ 
pricing behavior.  For example, in the market for Acetylcysteine, the DOJ recommended that 
Medicaid lower the AWP to the audited price for several products produced by three 
manufacturers, but did not make any price recommendations for the other seven manufacturers 
of this drug. Finding shifts in purchases away from targeted drugs towards their competitors as 
the relative price of targeted drugs declined would be evidence that pharmacies respond to the 
perverse incentives of the Medicaid program by stocking products with relatively high AWPs. 
Using more than a decade of Medicaid State Drug Utilization Data from the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), we demonstrate that actual reimbursement per 
prescription purchased declined substantially for targeted drugs following the 2000 DOJ 
recommendations, relative to competitor products whose AWPs were not targeted by the DOJ. 
We also find evidence of a decline in the number of targeted drug prescriptions dispensed to 
Medicaid patients by pharmacies and an increase in the number of competitor drugs dispensed. 
Overall, the market share, measured in terms of Medicaid prescriptions dispensed, for targeted 
drugs fell by about 45% through 2004, implying that pharmacies substituted away from drug 
products whose prices were reduced.  
                                                          
4 Office of the Attorney General, Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, State of New York, 2000.   
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In general, our results show that pharmacies respond to the incentives inherent in AWP-
based reimbursement by dispensing drugs in a manner consistent with profit-maximizing 
behavior, but inconsistent with a standard model of price competition in which lower-priced 
drugs capture higher market share. Medicaid procurement incentives have led at least some 
generic manufacturers to compete by (sometimes vastly) overstating AWPs, which can markedly 
reduce the cost savings to consumers or insurers from using generic drugs.   
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides detailed background 
about the AWP and related literature. Section 3 discusses the DOJ intervention. Section 4 
describes the data and sample restrictions. Section 5 outlines the empirical framework and 
presents the descriptive statistics and results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Background 
2.1. AWP Basics 
AWP-based reimbursement was first introduced by California's Medicaid program in 
1969, at a time when public and private insurers were just beginning to pay for prescription 
drugs (insurers accounted for only 15% of total drug spending in that year).5  Its predecessor, 
“cost-based” reimbursement, reimbursed pharmacies the exact amount they were charged by 
manufacturers to purchase the drug plus a fixed dispensing fee to cover labor and capital costs. 
This method led to a multitude of reimbursement amounts for identical products. More 
importantly, since pharmacies would receive the same (zero) profit margin from reimbursement 
regardless of their acquisition costs, drug manufacturers could in turn set high prices without 
reducing pharmacies' demand for their product.  
In contrast, the AWP approach provided an opportunity for pharmacies to profit from 
Medicaid reimbursement through the existence of a “spread.” The spread is the difference 
between the reimbursement amount (which is computed as a fixed proportion of each drug's 
AWP) and the pharmacy's actual acquisition costs. A positive (negative) spread is a profit (loss) 
for the pharmacy. Policymakers anticipated that pharmacies would seek to maximize this spread 
by searching for the lowest priced versions of generic drugs. In turn, this in theory would induce 
price competition among manufacturers, which would thereby allow Medicaid to lower their 
reimbursement amounts over time. Other states and private insurers soon adopted California's 
                                                          
5 Calculations from CMS National Health Accounts (2011). 
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model and publishers such as the Red Book, Blue Book, Medi-Span, and First Data Bank, 
entered the market to meet the demand for data on average wholesale prices. (See for example, 
Kolassa, 1994; Kolassa, 1997; Berndt and Newhouse, 2012; and Danzon et al., 2005; for a more 
detailed summary of the history of the AWP). 
A typical AWP-based reimbursement rule used by public and private payers is defined as 
follows. For each drug product dispensed to a recipient of insurance type , the pharmacy 
receives a reimbursement amount equal to6: 
  (1)     
Where Thus, a pharmacy earns a profit of , where 
is the acquisition cost of drug  from the manufacturer. 
Given that  and the dispensing fee are fixed across drugs, the  and  are the 
crucial factors governing whether pharmacies choose to stock one generic version over another. 
In pricing catalogues, the AWP is reported for each drug at the level of the National Drug Code 
(NDC). The NDC is a unique eleven-digit identification number assigned by the FDA to every 
drug product distributed in the U.S. The first 5 digits uniquely identify the manufacturer, the next 
4 digits identify the product code (which include the strength, dosage form, and formulation of 
the drug), and the final 2 digits identify the package size and type. Thus a single NDC code 
uniquely defines one drug produced by one particular manufacturer and is denoted by  in the 
equation above.  In the case of generic drugs, the NDC can distinguish between identical, 
bioequivalent drugs that are produced by different manufacturers because each version will have 
a unique NDC.   
For the Medicaid program, there are a few additional caveats regarding the parameters of 
the reimbursement rule. First, may vary across brand name and generic drugs (the former is 
typically smaller).7  Second, the AWP is sometimes replaced by a lower, government-determined 
price for certain generic drugs. These prices are known as the Federal Upper Limit (FUL) or the 
Maximum Allowable Cost (MAC). FULs, which were first established by the federal 
                                                          
6 This rule generates what is known as the “Estimated Acquisition Cost” (EAC) and reimbursement is based on the 
minimum of the EAC or “Usual and Customary Charge” (U&C). 
7 See, for example, state Medicaid reimbursement rules available on CMS website: 
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Benefits/Prescription-Drugs/State-
Prescription-Drug-Resources.html  
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government in 1987, denote the maximum price at which the Medicaid program will reimburse 
pharmacies for certain drugs. Generic drugs that have three or more manufacturers are frequently 
subject to these limits, which have been traditionally set at 150 percent of the lowest published 
AWP among all equivalent versions of the drug (KFF, 2002). Over 200 drugs were on the FUL 
list during the study period (OIG, 2001), though reports by the OIG suggest that not all eligible 
generic drugs receive FULs (OIG, 2004a, 2004b). MACs are similar to reimbursement limits for 
generic drugs that are set by each individual state's Medicaid program. These limits tend to be 
wider in scope and are more aggressive than FULs (Abramson, 2004). Third, there is also 
variation in the and the dispensing fee across states: the Medicaid  ranged from 0.05 to 0.15 
across states during the period under study (NPC, 2000).8 To the extent that any of these 
mechanisms do restrain prices, our results are net of these disciplinary devices.     
 
2.2. The AWP and Medicaid Procurement Incentives 
In the previous section we outlined the two main parameters governing transactions 
between payers, pharmacies, and manufacturers (  and ). In this section we briefly 
discuss how manipulation of the AWP can lead to a perverse form of price competition in which 
manufacturers compete to offer pharmacies the highest-priced version of a generic drug. We 
focus on the Medicaid program, but an analogous discussion can be applied to other payers 
including private insurers. 
First, recall that pharmacies earn a profit from Medicaid reimbursement if it generates a 
positive “spread”-- that is, the reimbursement (which is proportional to the ) exceeds the 
cost that pharmacies pay to acquire the drug from the manufacturer . Thus, when choosing 
among bioequivalent NDCs, pharmacies prefer to stock the NDC that generates the largest 
spread. In turn, manufacturers have an incentive to compete for pharmacy market share by 
offering the largest possible spread between  and . They can do so by bidding up the 
 and bidding down the . 
                                                          
8 CMS also requires that drug manufacturers pay rebates to pharmacies.  For generic and off-patent brand name 
drugs, the rebate is calculated as 13 percent of AMP in 2013 (Section 2501(b) of the Affordable Care Act). Specific 
states may have yet other mechanisms in place, such as formularies, that go at least some way toward restraining 
Medicaid reimbursement of generic drugs.    
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While it may have been the original intent of Medicaid's reimbursement policy that the 
AWP reflect an average of the actual prices that pharmacies pay manufacturers or wholesalers to 
acquire the drug, in practice, manufacturers self-report the  to the pricing catalogues. These 
self-reports are not subject to any independent verification (GAO, 2002). Consequently, as the 
GAO (2002) explains, the Average Wholesale Price “is neither an average nor a price that 
wholesalers charge...it is a number that manufacturers derive using their own criteria; there are 
no requirements or conventions that AWP reflect the price of any actual sale of drugs by a 
manufacturer.” Thus, since this price can be easily manipulated, manufacturers have an incentive 
to compete for pharmacy market share by simply reporting higher and higher AWPs.9 
In the presence of AWP-based Medicaid reimbursement rules, we would expect there to 
be a positive spread in equilibrium. A spread of zero ( ) is not sustainable, since if one 
manufacturer sets an such that  , then another firm can report  
 and capture the entire market, all else equal. Similarly, one manufacturer could 
set  <  with a similar outcome.  Thus, manufacturers may bid up the AWP and bid down  
to marginal costs.  In other words, Medicaid reimbursement policies provide an incentive for 
manufacturers to compete on the pharmacy’s profit margin, rather than on simply the acquisition 
price as a text book model of Bertrand price competition might predict.  While this type of 
manufacturer competition may lead to close to marginal cost pricing in transactions between 
pharmacies and manufacturers (as described in, e.g., Berndt and Newhouse, 2012; Berndt. et al., 
2011; Ching, 2010; Reiffen and Ward, 2005; Grabowski and Vernon, 1992), it may generate 
prices greatly exceeding marginal costs in transactions between pharmacies and purchasers (such 
as Medicaid and other private payers).10 Evidence from numerous audits of actual spreads 
discussed below supports the prediction that the AWP will be inflated for generic drugs (e.g. 
CBO, 2004; GAO, 2001; OIG, 2002).  Consequently, while the widespread availability of 
generic drugs is still largely perceived as unambiguously beneficial to consumers and payers, the 
                                                          
9 If the AWP reflected an average of the actual prices that pharmacies pay wholesalers, then increasing actual 
wholesale prices requires that the manufacturer trade off the gain from additional Medicaid purchases against the 
loss of purchases from other payers. In cases where Medicaid payments are a small share of sales, manufacturers 
may find it profit-maximizing to compete by bidding down the  rather than bidding up the . 
10 The threat of attracting regulatory attention presumably deters manufacturers from inflating the AWP to infinitely 
high levels. 
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cost savings from these drugs may be substantially overstated if the incentives of the 
reimbursement system lead manufacturers to report inflated AWPs for many drugs.11  
 
2.3. Evidence of the Spread and Related Literature 
Numerous studies conducted by government agencies (e.g. CBO, 2004; GAO, 2001; 
OIG, 2002) have uncovered large spreads for brand and generic drugs which are consistent with 
the hypothesis outlined in section 2.2 above. In one particularly striking study, the Office of 
Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services (2002) conducted an audit of 
approximately 200 randomly selected pharmacies in eight states to obtain 8,728 invoice prices 
for prescription drugs. The authors found that on average pharmacies' actual drug acquisition 
price was 83% of the published AWP for brand name drugs, 56% of the AWP for generic drugs 
without an FUL, and 28% of the AWP for drugs with an FUL. It is interesting to note that the 
AWP was more inflated for generic drugs than brands12, and even drugs subject to FULs 
(typically the least concentrated markets with 3 or more manufacturers) had substantially inflated 
AWPs.  If pharmacies' demand responds positively to the spread, increasing levels of 
competition among manufacturers could lead to increases in Medicaid drug spending. 
In related studies, government audits have also uncovered large profit margins for 
physician-administered drugs (e.g. chemotherapy) under reimbursement rules for Medicare Part 
B.  Before the Medicare Modernization Act was implemented in 2005, Medicare drug 
reimbursement to physicians was based on the same AWP-based payment rule as in the 
Medicaid program.13  In one Government Accountability Office audit (2001), physician’s 
average acquisition prices ranged from 66% to 87% of the AWP for a sample of the highest 
volume physician-administered drugs.  Some oncology drugs could be purchased by physicians 
for as low as 15% of the AWP.  Since physicians can substitute between therapeutically similar 
treatments for patients (brand and generic drugs alike), manufacturers of oncology drugs 
                                                          
11 The retail market for generics also may not be fully competitive for reasons beyond AWP pricing.  Berndt and 
Newhouse (2012) and Berndt et al., 2011, note that market power of certain retail pharmacies and pharmacy benefit 
managers may serve to restrain price competition at the retail level.   
12 The smaller spreads for brands relative to generics may also help accelerate the use of generic drugs, since 
pharmacies may earn greater profits from generic drugs than from branded drugs.  
13 Shea, et al. 2008 and Jacobson, et al. 2010 find that Medicare Part B’s switch from AWP to ASP resulted in 
changes in chemotherapy treatment patterns, but no reduction in the likelihood of treatment or wait times for the 
drugs included in the studies.  
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compete for physician market share in an analogous way that manufacturers of generic drugs 
compete for pharmacy market share.  
While the issue of AWP inflation has received considerable attention in government 
reports and a series of recent lawsuits filed by CMS, it has not been explored in the academic 
literature. The most similar study to the present one is Duggan and Scott-Morton (2006) which 
examines the impact of Medicaid procurement on prices for brand name drugs.14 However, in 
contrast to that paper, we focus on generic drugs.  The case for generics differs from the case for 
brands because Medicaid procurement distorts generic prices through its impact on pharmacy 
purchasing incentives. Pharmacies play an important and often overlooked role in driving price 
competition among multiple source drugs, yet relative to hospitals, physicians, nursing homes, 
and other providers, pharmacy behavior has received very little attention in the health economics 
literature.  While pharmacies cannot automatically substitute between different brand name 
drugs, they may choose among potentially dozens of suppliers to determine which version of a 
generic drug to stock and dispense.  Thus, generic manufacturers compete for pharmacy market 
share, whereas brand manufacturers compete for consumers and physicians who influence how 
prescriptions are written.   
A second related literature examines the impact of reimbursement rules more broadly on 
real (e.g. Gruber et al, 1999) and nominal (e.g. Dafny, 2005) health care utilization. This large 
literature documents evidence from many contexts of substitution by providers towards 
procedures and services that are more generously reimbursed. For example, Gruber et al. (1999) 
shows that variation in the Medicaid reimbursement differential between Cesarean and normal 
childbirth across states leads to an increased rate of Cesarean births in states with larger 
reimbursement differentials.  Dafny (2005) finds that differentials in Medicare reimbursement by 
the severity of diagnosis lead hospitals to falsely recode patients' diagnoses to the most 
profitable, high severity codes. While reimbursement differentials that distort actual treatment 
decisions could potentially have negative health consequences, distortions in simply the choice 
of manufacturers for generic drugs will not affect health. In this sense, our study is more similar 
to Dafny (2005) in that reimbursement distortions lead to higher public spending. 
                                                          
14 In another related study, Brekke, Holmas, and Straume (2011) examine the effects of drug procurement policies in 
Norway on price competition between off-patent brand name and generic drugs.  In a similar spirit to this paper, 
their empirical approach exploits quasi-experimental variation in the impact of a policy change across drug products 
to study the effects of reference pricing on prices and market shares.  
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2.4. Policy Significance  
Despite the perverse incentives of AWP-based reimbursement (and its potential for 
increasing drug spending), the AWP has been the dominant insurer reimbursement benchmark 
for over four decades, and it is still the primary benchmark for the majority of state Medicaid 
programs and many private insurers. As of the first quarter of 2013, 29 states still used the AWP 
as the benchmark price in setting Medicaid drug reimbursements, and 16 others used the WAC 
which is closely related to the AWP (CMS, 2013).  The issue of AWP inflation has attracted 
considerable attention from government agencies and policymakers in recent years.  While no 
policies have yet been put into place to fully replace the AWP, Medicaid has implemented 
several piecemeal interventions to mitigate AWP inflation, and it is possible that wholesale 
changes to the program will be implemented in the near future.  
First, federal and state governments have introduced maximum limits on Medicaid 
reimbursement, known as FULs or MACs, for select generic and off-patent drugs.  During the 
approximate midpoint of our study period, FULs covered over 200 drugs (OIG, 2001). 15  For 
drugs subject to FULs, the reimbursement limit has been traditionally set as 150% of the lowest 
published price (e.g. AWP) within a group of equivalent drugs (KFF, 2002).16    However, under 
this rule, manufacturers still have an incentive to self-report higher prices to drive up the 
minimum price and, consequently, the FUL.  Thus, these limits may not be effective at reducing 
reimbursement for covered drugs.  In 2012, an audit by the Office of the Inspector General found 
that FULs based on published list prices were on average more than four times greater than 
actual acquisition costs (OIG, 2012).  
Second, in 2005, the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) legislated replacing the AWP with 
another payment benchmark called the Average Manufacturer Price (AMP).  However, the 
provisions of the DRA were never implemented because pharmacy trade groups obtained a 
federal court injunction to prevent the publication and use of the AMP in reimbursement due to 
                                                          
15 Typically, multi-source drugs with three or more suppliers are eligible for FULs, however reports by the Office of 
the Inspector General (OIG, 2004a, 2004b) have found that many eligible drug groups do not receive FULs. 
16 The Affordable Care Act legislated a new benchmark for the FUL which was set to be 175% of the weighted 
average of the Average Manufacturer Price (AMP) as of October 2010.  However, CMS has not yet implemented 
this new FUL benchmark, and as of August 2012 FULs were still based on published list prices such as the AWP 
(OIG, 2012).   
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concern that this data-- which manufacturers currently report to Medicaid for use in its drug 
rebate program-- does not accurately reflect pharmacy prices (NASMD, 2010).   
Third, state Medicaid programs, Medicare, and private insurers have recently filed a 
series of lawsuits alleging that drug manufacturers have reported inflated AWPs to pricing 
catalogues.  In one example in 2010, three drug manufacturers Abbott Laboratories, Roxane 
Laboratories, and B. Braun Medical, faced a $421 million settlement for having “engaged in a 
scheme to report false and inflated prices for numerous pharmaceutical products knowing that 
federal healthcare programs relied on those reported prices to set payment rates (DOJ, 2010).”  
The Department of Justice reports that over $2 billion in settlements has been recovered to date 
by Medicaid and Medicare from drug manufacturers who have manipulated the AWP (DOJ, 
2012).   
Fourth, in another set of lawsuits, the publishers of pricing data themselves have been 
targeted for fraudulent practices.  First Data Bank (a major supplier of AWP data to Medicaid) 
stopped publishing the AWP in September of 2011 as a result of a major lawsuit against the 
publisher (OIG, 2011).  According to a report by the OIG (2011), the 45 states using the AWP as 
of early 2011 planned to respond to this change by 1) requesting AWP data from other publishers 
(10 states), 2) using the Wholesale Acquisition Cost (WAC) as the benchmark instead of the 
AWP (12 states), 3) collecting data on average acquisition costs (3 states), or 4) had no transition 
plan in place (20 states).17  The WAC, which has been the most popular alternative to the AWP, 
is also a manufacturer self-reported price and “in many instances it is currently the basis upon 
which the AWP is calculated (NASMD, 2010),” thus generating the same perverse reporting 
incentives and susceptibility for price inflation as the AWP. 
Fifth, in a proposed rule issued by CMS in February 2012, which is currently set to 
become final in August 2013, the agency proposes to shift away from reimbursement based on 
“estimated acquisition cost” (EAC) to reimbursement based on “actual acquisition cost” (AAC). 
Under this new definition, states would be required to provide data to support that their 
reimbursement methodology is representative of AAC. The proposed rule as written does not 
explicitly state how the AAC is to be calculated, but it suggests that states could use “a national 
survey, to create a database of actual acquisition costs…state survey of retail pharmacy 
                                                          
17 Three states intended to continue using the AWP but haven’t selected an alternative publisher, 3 considered 
replacing the AWP with the WAC, 6 intended to discontinue the AWP but haven’t taken steps to select a new 
benchmark, 8 had not decided whether they would continue AWP from another source or switch to WAC. 
13 
 
providers… [or] alternatively, the use of an AMP ” to determine reimbursement rates.18 
Meanwhile, over the last two years, CMS has begun fielding a survey of retail pharmacies’ 
acquisition prices to compute a new national benchmark, known as the National Average Drug 
Acquisition Cost (NADAC).  CMS says that it “expect[s] that states may consider the NADAC 
as a reference price when setting their reimbursement methodology,”19   
The future of Medicaid drug reimbursement continues to be a highly contested policy 
issue. With future expansions in Medicaid enrollment under the Affordable Care Act, reducing 
excessive prescription drug spending is likely to become an even more critical issue in the near 
term.  Even if and when the AWP is phased-out, alternative Medicaid reimbursement 
benchmarks such as the WAC, AMP NADAC, and others may generate similarly distortionary 
incentives as the AWP.   Indeed, as is clear from the proposed CMS rule and resulting 
stakeholder comments, and from discussions of potential policy remedies (NASMD, 2010), 
designing feasible and sensible alternatives to these benchmarks is not straightforward.20 In this 
paper we estimate pharmacy and manufacturer responses to the AWP.  Understanding the effects 
of AWP-based reimbursement on the pharmaceutical market is an important first step in 
evaluating policy alternatives that may generate similar perverse incentives.  To the best of our 
knowledge, this issue has not been systematically explored previously. 
 
3. Intervention 
3.1. Details of the DOJ Intervention 
This study focuses on a national investigation of AWPs by the DOJ and NAMFCU in the 
late 1990s. The agencies collected actual wholesale pricing data from wholesalers' catalogues 
which “revealed a pattern of misrepresentations by some drug manufacturers of the average 
wholesale prices and wholesale acquisition costs of certain of their products.” The actual 
                                                          
18 The proposed rule is 42 CFR 447.518, as documented in: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-02-
02/html/2012-2014.htm, and listed as 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201210&RIN=0938-AQ41, both accessed on 
6/19/2013.  
19 For details on the NADAC see: http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
Topics/Benefits/Prescription-Drugs/Survey-of-Retail-Prices.html  accessed on  6/19/2013. 
20 For example, the NADAC, which aims to measure acquisition prices more reliably than AWP, is derived from a 
voluntary survey of retail pharmacies. It therefore may not be representative of the universe of acquisition prices. 
Moreover, it excludes from its calculation discounts or rebates that are not listed on invoices. AMPs are prices 
charged by manufacturers, not paid by retail pharmacies, so they do not factor in wholesale markups.  
14 
 
wholesale prices were substantially lower than published AWPs. In an effort “to ensure that 
Medicaid drug prices are based on true information,” NAMFCU sent a letter in February 2000 to 
all state Medicaid pharmacy directors notifying them of the misrepresentations.21 Beginning on 
May 1, 2000, First Data Bank provided states with revised AWPs based on the pricing data 
uncovered in this investigation for approximately 400 NDCs representing about 50 drug 
products.22  States were strongly encouraged by NAMFCU to use these revised AWPs in place 
of the published AWPs in calculating reimbursements for these drugs. 
The 400 NDCs represent about 50 unique drugs and accounted for $306 million of 
Medicaid spending in 1999.23 These drugs are all generic and off-patent injectable, infusion, and 
inhalation products, including about a dozen oncology drugs and blood clotting factors. The full 
list of drugs targeted by the DOJ is reported in Table A.1 in the Appendix. The extent to which 
the AWP had been inflated for these drugs is staggering. The interquartile range of published 
AWPs24 relative to actual wholesale prices is 2.4 to 36.3 (for the median, the published AWP is 6 
times the actual price). For example, in one case, a manufacturer had reported an AWP of 
$948.46 for a pack of 2 ml vials of the generic antibiotic Amikacin Sulfate, while the 
investigation found that the actual wholesale price was only $125.00. Similarly large margins 
between the published AWP and the average wholesale price uncovered by the DOJ can be 
found for other drugs as shown in Table 1. 
While all states received the recommendation to adopt the AWP revisions, the use of 
these new prices was voluntary. A survey conducted by the Office of the Inspector General 
(2001) found that as of January-March 2001, 30 states had incorporated some or all of the 
revised AWPs into their reimbursements to pharmacies.25 The remaining states continued to be 
supplied with the original, manufacturer-reported AWPs from First Data Bank. States that did 
not adopt the revisions expressed concern that the new prices were too low, potentially 
                                                          
21 For example, see Office of the Attorney General, Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, State of New York, 2000. 
22 It was also indicated that First Data Bank would update the prices for the 400 NDCs from data from actual 
wholesale catalogs every 6 months. However, some states reported concern that First Data Bank would not update 
the prices unless the DOJ and NAMFCU continued to provide them with wholesale catalogue prices (OIG, 2001). 
23 This figure is calculated by the authors using Medicaid State Drug Utilization Data for all states except Arizona. 
Arizona is the only state that does not participate in the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program and therefore does not 
report drug utilization data to CMS. 
24 We compare the actual wholesale prices uncovered in the DOJ investigation (HHS, 2000) with the AWPs 
published in the 1999 Red Book. 
25 The states that adopted the revisions as of 2001 are: AK, CT, DC, DE, FL, HI, ID, IL, IN, KS, KY, MD, MN, 
MO, MT, ND, NH, NJ, NM, NV, NY, OK, OR, PA, SC, UT, VT, WA, WI, WV. 
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compromising beneficiaries' access to these drugs (OIG, 2001). It is worth noting that states that 
had not adopted the revisions at the time of the survey may have decided to adopt them later or, 
in any case, adopted them in a de facto manner when catalogues stopped publishing the 
manufacturer-reported AWPs for targeted drugs in later years.26  Conversely, some early adopter 
states may have eventually discontinued the use of the AWP revisions.27 
This intervention provides a “quasi-experiment” to study the impact of Medicaid 
procurement on price competition for generic drugs. It generated a large and sudden reduction in 
the price on which Medicaid reimbursement is based for a select set of NDCs within classes of 
bioequivalent products. Prices for the bioequivalent competitors of targeted NDCs were not 
directly affected by the DOJ intervention. That said, the competitors are not a set of pure 
“control” NDCs because although they were not singled out in the DOJ audit, the DOJ 
intervention may have changed the nature of AWP reporting itself. It is possible that after the 
DOJ announcement, drug manufacturers may have become more cautious in reporting highly 
inflated AWPs that might draw attention from regulators or litigators.  To the extent that we see 
an effect on prescriptions and market shares for targeted drugs relative to competitor drugs, this 
should represent a downward biased estimate of the effect of the intervention. It should be noted 
that the intervention may also have led to changes in the actual acquisition price paid by 
pharmacies for the drugs.  Unfortunately, we do not have acquisition price data and cannot 
investigate whether those prices changed in response to the intervention.   
For the approximately 50 “treated” drug markets, we examine how the pharmacy market 
share for targeted NDCs changed following the reduction in the relative price of these drugs. We 
proxy for pharmacy market share using Medicaid utilization.28 Appendix Figure A.1 illustrates 
this “experiment” for one drug market, Acetylcysteine. In this market, only select NDCs of 
Acetylcysteine produced by the manufacturer Abbott were targeted by the DOJ (the large 
quantity packages), all Acetylcysteine NDCs produced by Faulding were targeted, and no 
                                                          
26 For instance, the Red Book began to publish revised AWPs for some of the targeted NDCs in 2002. 
27 Finally, even among states that adopted the revisions, not all revised prices for targeted drugs were implemented. 
For example, some hemophilia groups claimed that treatment would be discontinued if prices were not increased, 
leading some states to exclude blood clotting factors from the revisions (OIG, 2001). 
28 Recall that the consumers should be price insensitive across bioequivalent generics produced by different 
manufacturers. Thus shifts in utilization from one manufacturer's version to another's version reflect changes in the 
purchasing patterns of pharmacies.  Further, while Medicaid outpatient drug utilization corresponds one-to-one with 
pharmacy dispensing, our data will not capture changes in the total number of drugs purchased and stocked by 
pharmacies. We are unaware of any national-level dataset that would provide this level of detail on pharmacy 
purchasing. 
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Acetylcysteine  NDCs produced by Bedford were targeted.   Since these targeted and non-
targeted products are bioequivalent substitutes, we can test the effect of the differential price 
shock for targeted NDCs on their market share.  As shown in the figure, the market share (as 
measured by prescriptions dispensed) of targeted Acetylcysteine NDCs plummeted after states 
adopted the DOJ prices.  
Following the discussion in Section 2, we predict that the incentives embedded in 
Medicaid procurement rules should induce pharmacies to substitute away from the drugs that 
experienced the price reduction and towards their competitors' products, leading to a decline in 
the market share for targeted drugs. This contrasts with a standard model of price competition in 
which the price decline would be predicted to cause an increase in pharmacy market share. 
Consequently, if pharmacies reward higher-priced drugs with greater market share, this provides 
an incentive for manufacturers to compete by bidding up the published price. 
 
4. Data Sources 
4.1. Data 
The main source of data for this paper is the Medicaid State Drug Utilization Data 
published by CMS.29  The data series tracks Medicaid spending and utilization by NDC for each 
state and quarter from 1991 through the present.  NDCs only appear in the data if they have non-
zero Medicaid utilization in the state and quarter. We aggregate the quarterly data to annual 
totals. 30 We focus primarily on two variables: the number of prescriptions and the total 
reimbursement. From this we construct reimbursement per prescription and the market share for 
targeted drugs. Given that Medicaid reimbursement is largely determined by the AWP, 
reimbursement per prescription and AWP should be strongly correlated. The data set also 
includes information about NDC characteristics such as the drug name, FDA approval date, 
whether it is a generic or brand name drug, and the unit type (e.g. capsule, tablet, milliliter). 
We obtained the list of 411 NDCs that were targeted by the DOJ from a Program 
Memorandum issued by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS, 2000).31 This 
                                                          
29 State Drug Utilization Data which is collected for the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program  is available from the CMS 
website:  https://www.cms.gov/MedicaidDrugRebateProgram/SDUD/list.asp 
30 The quarterly data are highly noisy. This variation may reflect when claims are processed rather than actual 
patterns in drug use. 
31 This memorandum was issued to notify the Medicare program of the alternative source of average wholesale data 
that was uncovered by the DOJ and NAMFCU for the Medicaid program. 
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document contains the actual average wholesale price found in the DOJ audit for each NDC. We 
use the eleven-digit NDCs reported in this Memorandum to identify the targeted NDCs in the 
State Drug Utilization Data. We find that 379 of the 411 NDCs had non-zero Medicaid 
utilization the year before the intervention. 
In this study, we compare changes in purchasing patterns for the targeted NDCs and their 
competitors whose prices were not directly revised by the DOJ.  To identify a set of competitor 
drugs, we begin by identifying for each targeted NDC the set of drugs that share the same active 
ingredients as the targeted NDC.  In choosing which drugs to stock and dispense, pharmacies 
may substitute between one generic and another (or a generic and an off-patent brand name 
drug)32 if they are bioequivalent. NDCs are bioequivalent if all of the following are true: the 
NDCs share the same active ingredient name, strength, and therapeutic equivalence rating as 
reported in the FDA publication, “Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence 
Evaluations” (also known as the Orange Book). 
Thus, the analysis sample includes the approximately 400 NDCs that received revised 
AWPs and all other NDCs (generics and off-patent brands) that have the same active ingredient 
names as those in the revised group. We use the drug name variable to extract these NDCs from 
the State Drug Utilization Data.33 For generic drugs, the drug name is the same as the active 
ingredient name. For off-patent brand name drugs (both active and discontinued), we use the 
Orange Book34 to obtain the list of brand names that have the same active ingredient name as the 
targeted NDCs. Using this market definition, there are 379 targeted NDCs and 2,839 competitor 
NDCs with positive Medicaid utilization in 1999. While this market definition is somewhat 
broader than generic bioequivalence, it allows us to capture possible substitutions across 
different formulations of a generic drug if pharmacists seek permission from the prescribing 
physicians to make these substitutions.35  
                                                          
32 This sometimes requires permission from the prescribing doctor, but is at the discretion of the pharmacy in states 
with mandatory generic substitution laws. 
33 This process is aided by linking the utilization data by NDC code to CMS's Drug Product File in order to 
determine the full name of each drug product. In the full US sample, the Drug Product File can be linked to about 
55% of the NDCs in the utilization data. For NDCs that are not matched with a full drug name, we use the 
abbreviated drug name that appears in the utilization data. 
34 The FDA Orange Book is available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm  
35 For example, a pharmacy might respond to the DOJ intervention by stocking only the formulations of a generic 
drug which are most profitable (e.g. liquid version vs. tablet, or a specific concentration).  Patients who receive a 
prescription for a formulation of a drug that is not stocked by the pharmacy may be induced by the pharmacy to 
switch to a different formulation with permission from their doctor.  
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4.2. Sample Restrictions 
We restrict our analysis to the period from 1994-2004, since changes in the composition 
of drugs over time make data further away from the intervention year less comparable. Our 
initial sample is constructed at the NDC-by-state-by-year level and includes 795,694 
observations. We make three other sample restrictions. First, we exclude five states from the 
analysis: Arizona, Alabama, Ohio, Tennessee, and Texas. Arizona does not report drug 
utilization data to CMS because it does not participate in the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program. 
The other four states do not use AWP as their primary reimbursement methodology (OIG, 2001). 
This reduces the sample by 66,190 observations. Second, we drop NDCs for hemophilia drugs 
(Anti-Inhibitor Coagulant Complex, Factor VIII, Factor IX). Hemophilia patient groups opposed 
the DOJ recommended prices leading many states to implement alternative prices for these drugs 
(OIG, 2001). These three biological drugs are also unusually expensive relative to the other 
drugs targeted by the DOJ. They have the highest average reimbursement per prescription among 
drugs in the sample, ranging from $10,493 to $16,369 per prescription in 1999.36 Removing 
these drugs from the sample reduces total reimbursement by 15.59% and total prescriptions by 
only 0.04%. Finally we exclude 5 observations that are extreme outliers in reimbursement per 
prescription, which are likely reporting errors.37  
The final NDC-by-state-by-year sample includes 723,991 observations. Since the 
intervention occurred at the NDC level, we aggregate the data across states to form nationwide 
totals for each NDC (though later differentiate between states that adopted the DOJ prices early 
versus other states). There are 32,203 NDC-by-year observations in the final analysis sample. 
 
5. Empirical Evidence of Reverse Price Competition 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics and Graphical Evidence 
We begin by presenting descriptive statistics and trends for reimbursement and 
prescriptions purchased.  Much of the evidence for the intervention effect can be seen in the raw 
means and graphically.  In Table 2, descriptive statistics are reported separately for NDCs that 
                                                          
36 For comparison, Winrho SDF, which was the next most expensive drug in the sample, has a mean reimbursement 
per prescription of $2,080 which is substantially lower than the cost of the hemophilia drugs. 
37 We remove the following outlier observations because they differ substantially from the same NDCs in other 
states and years: NDC=00074115170, ME, 1996; NDC=59075065220, WA, 2003; NDC=39769001101, IL, 1991; 
NDC=49669162301, AR, 2002; NDC=00026064920, VA, 1999. 
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were targeted in the DOJ investigation and for their bioequivalent competitors. Means of 
variables are presented for units aggregated at the NDC level, except for the drug group market 
share variable, which is aggregated at the “drug group” level (i.e. the class of drugs that share the 
same drug name). The means are shown for 1999 and the change between 1999 and 2002. 
Columns 1 and 2 reveal that the DOJ-targeted NDCs were on average about 3 times more 
expensive than their bioequivalent competitor NDCs in 1999. The targeted NDCs were also 
Medicaid market leaders with an average market share that was more than 5 times as large as 
their competitors' market shares. However, since there were fewer targeted NDCs, they made up 
a smaller share of the overall market. Targeted drugs were also much more likely to have a liquid 
formulation than competitor drugs, which may explain some of the price differential. 
We first show suggestive evidence that pharmacies may have shifted away from 
purchasing targeted drugs following the intervention.  The data show a decline in both mean 
Medicaid reimbursement per prescription and the number of prescriptions dispensed for targeted 
NDCs from 1999 to 2002, coinciding with the timing of the DOJ intervention. In the same time 
period, reimbursements per prescription and sales increased for competitor NDCs.  
We further examine whether the 1999-2002 change in reimbursement and prescriptions 
varied across competitor drugs depending on whether or not their manufacturer was targeted by 
the DOJ for other NDCs within the same drug class. We might expect that competitor NDCs 
produced by targeted manufacturers would respond differently to the intervention for a few 
reasons. First, because these manufacturers were under increased scrutiny by the DOJ, they may 
have halted price growth or even lowered prices on non-targeted products in attempt to avoid 
further investigation. Second, targeted manufacturers may have been able to more readily switch 
marketing and production efforts between their targeted and non-targeted products within a drug 
group, leading to a large observed increase in non-targeted “competitor” products. On the other 
hand, this effect would be mitigated if pharmacies were reluctant to purchase non-targeted 
products from the manufacturers who were under the most scrutiny. 
Columns 3 and 4 report means for competitor NDCs produced by targeted and non-
targeted manufacturers. Competitor NDCs produced by targeted firms are very similar to 
targeted NDCs (Column 1) in terms of observable characteristics, such as baseline 
reimbursement per prescription and unit type. Moreover, similar to targeted NDCs, competitor 
NDCs of targeted firms saw a small decline in their average reimbursement following the 
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intervention. In contrast, reimbursement per prescription increased by 25 percent for competitor 
NDCs of non-targeted firms. NDCs from non-targeted firms also experienced substantially larger 
growth in the average number of prescriptions purchased relative to competitor NDCs from 
targeted firms (a 56% versus 0.5% increase). While the means presented in this table are 
consistent with the hypothesized effects of the DOJ intervention, the changes in outcomes from 
1999-2002 may also reflect differences in longer-term trends across targeted and competitor 
NDCs.   
Figure 1 documents how reimbursement per prescription, prescription purchases, and 
market share evolved from 1991 through 2004 for targeted and competitor NDCs. Prior to the 
intervention, mean reimbursement per prescription had been rising rapidly since 1991 for both 
sets of drugs. For targeted drugs, reimbursement per prescription flattened and then declined 
sharply after the intervention in 2000. The leveling off before 2000 may reflect an early response 
to the intervention, given that the DOJ's planned policy was outlined to Medicaid State Pharmacy 
Directors at a national conference in the summer of 1999.38 The drop in reimbursement per 
prescription was not a one-time change, but continued to decline until 2003. This is not 
surprising given the gradual adoption of the DOJ recommendations by many states. In contrast, 
there was no corresponding break in the reimbursement trend for the competitor NDCs with 
average reimbursement continuing to increase through 2004. These two graphs suggest that the 
DOJ recommendations had a real impact on actual Medicaid reimbursement trends-- reducing 
the price of targeted drugs relative to competitors' prices. 
In panel B, trends for the quantity of prescriptions purchased mimic the reimbursement 
trends. For targeted and competitor NDCs there are trend reversals following the intervention: 
prescriptions declined for targeted NDCs and increased for competitor NDCs. Moreover, the 
overall market share of targeted drugs declined after the intervention (Panel C). This is strong 
suggestive evidence of a substitution effect. For competitor NDCs, the reversal in trend for 
prescriptions (and targeted market share) occurred one year prior to the intervention. We 
examine this further in Figure 2 by separately plotting the trends in average annual prescriptions 
per NDC for competitor NDCs manufactured by targeted firms and non-targeted firms. Both 
trends increased throughout the study period.  Nonetheless, the figure also shows a noticeable 
uptick in prescriptions in 1999 for competitor NDCs manufactured by targeted firms. One 
                                                          
38 Office of the Attorney General, Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, State of New York, 2000.   
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possible explanation for this sudden jump in prescriptions is that targeted firms may have 
anticipated the intervention and tried to circumvent a loss in market share by shifting sales to 
non-targeted products within each drug group. If this uptick represents an anticipatory response 
by targeted firms, then measuring the change in prescriptions using 1999 as the base year (as in 
Table 2) attenuates the effect of the intervention for competitor drugs. 
 
5.2. Main Regression Results 
 
5.2.1. Reimbursement per Prescription 
To estimate the magnitude of the changes in reimbursement per prescription and 
prescriptions purchased, we turn to regression analysis. We begin by documenting the impact of 
the DOJ intervention on average reimbursement per prescription. If DOJ prices are incorporated 
into state reimbursement policies, we would expect to observe a reduction in the actual Medicaid 
reimbursement paid per prescription for the targeted NDCs starting in 2000. The differential 
impact of the intervention on reimbursement per prescription for targeted NDCs relative to 
competitor NDCs is a necessary criteria for identifying the impact of price on pharmacy 
purchasing decisions. 
We first estimate a non-parametric model to test whether there is a structural break in the 
targeted NDC trend relative to the competitor NDC trend around the time of the intervention in 
2000:    
            (2)            
 
The dependent variable is the log of reimbursement per prescription for  in year . 
We estimate proportional changes in reimbursement per prescription to allow for comparisons 
across drugs with widely different initial reimbursement levels. We control for permanent 
differences across NDCs and common year effects with a vector of NDC fixed effects (  and a 
vector of year fixed effects ( ), respectively.  is an indicator variable which equals one 
for targeted NDCs and zero for competitor NDCs. Standard errors are clustered at the drug group 
level39 to allow for correlation across NDCs within drug groups and serial correlation over time. 
                                                          
39 The drug group is the group of NDCs that share the same drug name. 
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The main coefficients of interest are the vector of estimated ’s   in which each  gives 
the change in the targeted-competitor reimbursement difference between year  and the (omitted) 
reference year of 1999. These coefficients are reported in Column 1 of Table 3. Targeted and 
competitor NDCs appear to have had the same reimbursement trends before the intervention, as 
reflected in the statistically insignificant coefficients prior to 2000. However, after states adopted 
DOJ prices in 2000, there was a very large and statistically significant relative decline in 
reimbursement per prescription for targeted drugs. This differential continued to widen until 
2003 and then leveled off. Between 2000 and 2004, the relative reimbursement per prescription 
fell by 26% for targeted drugs compared to the 4 year change between 1994 and 1998 
. 
Based on the results from the non-parametric model, we next parameterize this 
specification by imposing a trend break in 2000 and allowing the effect to have a level and slope 
shift. This model allows us to estimate an average intervention effect. We also allow targeted and 
competitor NDCs to have separate linear trends.  The slope shift is motivated by the graphical 
evidence in Figure 1 which showed that the drop in the reimbursement per prescription was not a 
one-time change but continued to decline over time as more states adopted the DOJ 
recommendations. The estimating equation is: 
 
(3)      
 
is an indicator that equals 1 in 2000-2004 and zero in 1994-1999.  is a linear time trend 
and equals 1 in 2001, 2 in 2002 and so forth. Standard errors are again clustered at 
the drug group level. The intercept shift for targeted NDCs relative to competitor NDCs is 
measured by  and the differential slope shift by . The key identifying assumption is that 
reimbursement per prescription for targeted and competitor NDCs would have continued along 
the same trends in the absence of the intervention. Combining these coefficients as  
gives the estimated effect of the intervention on targeted NDCs through 2004. The results from 
estimating Equation 3 are reported in Column 2 of Table 3. There is a statistically significant 
differential intercept and slope shift for targeted NDCs after 2000. The intervention appears to 
have reduced average reimbursement per prescription by 44% through 2004 
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. This estimate is larger than the non-parametric estimate because the 
point-by-point comparison did not account for an intercept shift.40 
In column 3, we examine the robustness of this result to adding linear trends that vary by 
drug group  x Target cells. Given the limited statistical power, we do not use NDC-specific 
time trends in this analysis -- which would be the most flexible specification. We continue to 
constrain the slope and intercept shifts to be the same for all targeted NDCs and for all 
competitor NDCs. This model, which adds flexible time trends to Equation 3, is estimated as 
follows: 
         (4)        
 
 
The results are highly robust to the more flexible specification. The results suggest that 
reimbursement per prescription declined by 50% through 2004 for targeted NDCs relative to 
competitor NDCs . Next, as a sensitivity test, we exclude competitor 
NDCs whose manufacturers were targeted by the DOJ for other NDCs within the same drug 
group -- thus comparing targeted NDCs with competitor NDCs whose firms were not targeted 
for other drug products. As discussed earlier, competitor NDCs made by targeted manufacturers 
may respond differently to the intervention given the likelihood that they are under heightened 
scrutiny and also because they can shift market share between their targeted drugs and their own 
non-targeted bioequivalent products. The results in Column 4 show that the intercept shift and 
slope shift are slightly larger after excluding these NDCs. The total effect of the intervention on 
reimbursement per prescription through 2004 is 54% for targeted NDCs, which is only slightly 
larger than the previous estimate using the full sample. 
It should be noted that the results presented in this section likely represent lower bound 
estimates of the DOJ's impact on reimbursement per prescription for two reasons. First, the 
estimates represent aggregate effects. Since not every state adopted DOJ prices or implemented 
the full set of recommended changes, the aggregate effect is smaller than the impact on states 
that were fully compliant with DOJ recommendations. Second, we can only observe prices for 
drug products with positive sales. If the products with the largest price declines were more likely 
                                                          
40 Estimating the intervention effect using only a slope shift results in a 25% decline  in 
reimbursement per prescription which is very close to the estimate of 26% from the non-parametric model.   
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to be discontinued by manufacturers or generate zero sales, our estimate would understate the 
impact of the intervention on reimbursement per prescription since the largest price reductions 
are selected out of the sample. 
 
5.2.2. Prescriptions Purchased 
Given the substantial differential impact of the DOJ intervention on reimbursement per 
prescription for targeted NDCs, we next examine how pharmacy purchasing decisions responded 
to this plausibly exogenous price shock. There are three main mechanisms through which the 
intervention could have caused changes in the quantity and composition of generic drugs used by 
Medicaid beneficiaries. First, pharmacies may have reduced their purchasing of targeted NDCs 
(whose relative price declined) and substituted towards competitor NDCs (whose relative price 
increased)--thereby lowering the pharmacy market share of targeted drugs. Second, reductions in 
reimbursement may have reduced access to these drugs for Medicaid beneficiaries. For example, 
manufacturers may respond to reduced demand for their products following the DOJ intervention 
by discontinuing production of targeted generic drugs. Consolidation in the number of generic 
producers for a given drug may make these products vulnerable to shortages which reduce access 
to beneficiaries (Chabner, 2011; Yurukoglu, 2012).  The reduced reimbursement may also affect 
pharmacies’ decisions to stock and dispense drugs for Medicaid beneficiaries-- a noted concern 
by patient groups, which may have prevented some states from adopting DOJ prices (OIG, 
2001).  This would cause a decline in the total prescriptions dispensed for these drug groups.  
Finally, manufacturers may have strategically discontinued products that were targeted 
by the DOJ and re-introduced these products (repackaging the drug or modifying the formulation 
with a new NDC). If manufacturers introduce a new version of a targeted drug, the product will 
be assigned a new NDC code which will not be subject to the price recommendations made by 
the DOJ.  Thus, manufacturers can circumvent profit loss by discontinuing targeted NDCs and 
introducing new, modified versions of these products that would not be targeted by the policy. If 
this type of product exit and entry occurred, we would observe a decline in targeted market 
share. 
In this analysis, we do not attempt to separately identify the relative contribution of each 
of these mechanisms to the change in prescription quantities. Instead, we use measures that 
summarize the total intervention effect: market share of targeted drugs and total prescriptions 
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purchased in the drug group. In order to capture changes to market share that occur through the 
introduction or discontinuation of NDCs, we aggregate the data to drug group-by-year cells. 
Again we begin by estimating year effects in a non-parametric model in order to identify trend 
breaks in the time series: 
 
(5)      
The dependent variable is the market share for targeted drugs, computed as the number of 
prescriptions of targeted NDCs in drug group  in year  divided by the total number of 
prescriptions in drug group  in year . Observations with zero targeted market share are 
included. However we exclude any drug group-by-year observations for years in which there are 
no sales for both targeted and competitor NDCs in the drug group. This leaves 480 drug group-
by-year observations. We control for drug group fixed effects ( ) and include a set of year fixed 
effects (  treating 1999 as the reference (omitted) year. We cluster standard errors at the drug 
group level.  
Column 1 of Table 4 reports the full set of  coefficients which trace out the time pattern 
of market share for targeted drugs from 1994-2004 relative to market share in 1999. The negative 
coefficients before and after the reference year reflect an increasing trend in targeted market 
share during the pre-period and a decreasing trend following the intervention. Although the 
change between 1999 and 2000 is not statistically significant, the negative coefficients in 1998 
and 2000 suggest that the trend reversal may have begun in 2000 as predicted. The decline in 
targeted market share accelerated through 2004. A joint significance test rejects that all of the 
negative coefficients following the intervention are equal to zero at the 10% level. Relative to the 
4-year change from 1994 to 1998, the intervention led to a statistically significant decline in 
targeted market share of 16.1 percentage points from 2000 and 2004 ( 
=-0.161 with a standard error of 0.058). This suggests that pharmacies 
substituted towards the competitor products after the intervention. 
Next, we parameterize the effect by estimating a linear trend break model which is 
analogous to Equation 3: 
                   
 (6)     
26 
 
 
The results in Column 2 of Table 4 show that there was a statistically significant slope change in 
the trend for targeted market share in 2000 and a statistically insignificant intercept shift. The 
market share for targeted drugs fell by 18.4 percentage points by 2004 , a 45% 
decline relative to the baseline mean of 40.9% in 1999. This is similar to the effect size found in 
the non-parametric specification when one considers the pre-existing trend in the average 
targeted market share. In Column 3 of Table 4, we add drug group specific linear time trends. 
The more flexible specification produces slightly larger effects suggesting that targeted market 
share declined by an average of 18.8 percentage points by 2004 (a 46% reduction).41 
In Columns 4 and 5, we decompose the change in competitor drugs' market share by 
whether or not the NDCs were manufactured by targeted firms. We re-estimate the most flexible 
version of Equation 5 using competitor market shares for targeted firms or non-targeted firms as 
the dependent variables. Consistent with the descriptive statistics and visual evidence discussed 
earlier, there was a smaller increase in market share for competitor drugs manufactured by 
targeted firms (3.0 percentage point increase through 2004 versus 15.9 percentage points). This 
may reflect pharmacies reluctance to substitute towards competitor NDCs from the firms that 
have a higher chance of being targeted in future DOJ investigations.   
 
5.3 Additional Specifications 
 
5.3.1. Effects for Early Adopter States versus Other States 
As discussed in Section 3.1, not all states adopted the DOJ recommendations 
immediately. Some states may have adopted the recommendations with a lag or not at all.  In 
Table 5, we compare the time pattern of reimbursement per prescription and targeted market 
share for the 30 states that reported in an OIG survey (2001) that they had incorporated some or 
all of the recommended AWP changes as of January-March 2001 (Columns 1 and 3) with all 
                                                          
41 A reasonable next step is to combine the estimate of the effect of the DOJ intervention on price (Column 3 of 
Table 3) with the effect on market share (Column 3 of Table 4) to compute an indirect least squares estimate of the 
price elasticity of pharmacy demand. This estimate is 0.92 (0.46/0.50), a positive number that is at odds with that of 
a standard competitive market in which the lowest priced drugs capture the highest pharmacy market share. 
However, this is suggestive since we do not have enough statistical power to precisely estimate this price elasticity. 
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other states (Columns 2 and 4).42  We would expect to find a differential effect for the early 
adopter states in the early years after the recommendations were released.   
As shown in Columns 1 and 2, the differential decline in reimbursement for targeted 
NDCs was much larger for early adopter states during the first few years after the intervention. 
Over time, the decline for the two groups of states converged, as more states adopted the 
recommendations.  This pattern of the timing of the response across states provides more 
reassuring evidence of a causal relationship between the DOJ policy and the observed decline in 
price.  
In Columns 3 and 4, we also compare trends in targeted market share for early adopter 
states and all other states. Consistent with the time patterns for reimbursement per prescription, 
targeted market share declined earlier and was greater in magnitude for early adopter states. For 
the states that hadn't adopted the revisions at the time of the survey in 2001, market share did not 
begin to decline until 2003. This mimics the results for reimbursement per prescription, which 
showed that reimbursement for targeted NDCs declined primarily in the later years of the post-
intervention period for the states that hadn't initially adopted the revisions. 
 
5.3.2. Treatment Heterogeneity by Market Characteristics 
We next examine heterogeneity in the effects on reimbursement and prescriptions 
purchased across the approximately 50 drug markets affected by the DOJ intervention.   
Significant variation exists across markets with respect to the initial market share of targeted 
drugs, the magnitude of the pre-intervention spread for targeted drugs, and the number of firms 
producing competing drug products.  In Table 6, we test for heterogeneous effects in log 
reimbursement per prescription (Panel A) and targeted market share (Panel B) by interacting the 
intercept and slope terms in Equations 4 and 6 with indicators for these market characteristics.   
For each of the market characteristics that we consider and for both dependent variables 
we run two separate regressions—one for the full sample, and one for a trimmed sample where 
                                                          
42 As in our previous specifications, we exclude Arizona which does not provide drug utilization data to Medicaid 
and the four states (AL, OH, TN, TX) that the OIG survey (2001) identified as relying on “methods other than the 
AWP as its primary reimbursement methodology.” While these four states might appear to provide a natural 
“control” group with which to test the effects of the DOJ policy on the other states, these states also may have 
incorporated some or all the DOJ prices into their own reimbursement methodologies. For example, there is 
documentation suggesting that Texas adopted the DOJ prices in 2000 for the targeted drug products (Texas Office of 
the Comptroller, 2003). Because of the uncertainty surrounding the reimbursement policies in these four states, we 
exclude them from the analysis. 
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we exclude drug groups with targeted market share below 5%, and four drug groups with 
targeted market share greater than 95% (three out of the four are 100%). We report results for the 
trimmed sample because the responsiveness of these drugs groups to the DOJ intervention is 
muted because they are bounded from below or above.43  Full sample results are reported in even 
numbered columns and trimmed sample results are in odd numbered columns.  
We begin by repeating the baseline specification results in Column 1 for the full sample, 
and then reporting the results for the trimmed sample in column 2. The baseline results are 
largely robust to excluding drug groups with the most limited scope for a market share response. 
We then report results showing how the treatment effects differ across drug groups with initial 
targeted market share above or below the median.  In the full sample, for drug groups classified 
as above the median, targeted drugs accounted for on average 71% of the market prior to the 
intervention, compared to 10% for drug groups classified as below the median.  In Columns 3 
and 4, we report coefficients for the main slope and intercept terms and the interaction of the 
main effects with an indicator for whether the drug group’s initial targeted market share was 
above the median.  As shown in Panel A of Table 6, drug groups with high or low initial targeted 
market share experienced similar proportional reductions in reimbursement per prescription 
following the intervention.   However, as shown in Panel B, the decline in market share is almost 
entirely concentrated among drug groups where targeted drugs initially comprised a larger share 
of the market.  The coefficient on the slope term interacted with the above median initial targeted 
market share is -0.084 and is statistically significant at the 1% level (implying a 58% decline in 
targeted market share through 2004 for drug groups above the median), while the main effects, 
capturing the responses for below median drug groups, are close to zero and statistically 
insignificant.  These results can be largely explained by the fact that markets with low initial 
targeted market share simply have less scope for decreasing market share. 
In Columns 5 and 6, we test for heterogeneity across drug groups which had smaller or 
larger spreads.  We use the published AWP in the 1999 Red Book and the actual acquisition 
price uncovered in the DOJ audit to compute actual spreads for each of the targeted NDCs in the 
baseline year. To obtain a prescription-weighted average spread for each drug group, we 
simulate total reimbursement for all NDCs in the drug group under the AWP benchmark (i.e. 
                                                          
43 Trimming the sample to exclude drug groups with targeted market share less than 1%-4% and greater than or 
equal to 96%-100% produce very similar results. Results are available upon request. 
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summing the product of the AWP and number of prescriptions across NDCs) and divide that by 
simulated total reimbursement using the actual acquisition price as the benchmark.  Then we 
interact the slope and intercept terms with an indicator for whether the drug group had an 
average spread that was larger than the median (AWP is 3.4 times as large as the acquisition 
price).   As expected, in both Columns 5 and 6, we find that reductions in reimbursement per 
prescription are much greater for drug groups with the largest spreads at baseline.  In response to 
the differential decline in reimbursement, we find that targeted market share also declined more 
for the drug groups with a larger initial spread. The difference between the two subgroups is not 
statistically significant in the full sample, but is larger in absolute value and statistically 
significant in the trimmed sample. The insignificance of the difference in the full sample appears 
to be largely due to a set of low targeted market share drug groups that have limited scope for 
downward adjustment. Over a four year period, the difference, as reported in the trimmed sample 
in Column 6, amounts to a relative decline of 28 percentage points.  
Finally, in the last two columns of Table 6. we compare the treatment effects for drug 
markets that are more or less concentrated.  We identify the number of manufacturers producing 
products in each drug group by counting the number of unique labeler codes, the first 5-digits of 
the NDC, in 1999.   Drugs produced by an above median number of manufacturers have on 
average 24 competing firms, whereas below median drug groups have on average 3 competing 
firms.   For both the full and trimmed samples, the number of manufacturers producing a drug 
does not strongly predict a differential response for reimbursement per prescription.    Similarly, 
we do not find a statistically significant differential effect of market concentration on targeted 
market share.   
 
5.4 Additional Margins of Adjustment 
Thus far we have focused on the substitution effect of the intervention:  pharmacies 
switching between targeted and competitor drugs.  It is worth noting that the inflated AWP prices 
of Medicaid prescriptions for targeted drugs prior to the intervention, plus the distortion of 
Medicaid prescriptions toward these drugs, implies negative effects on welfare. Tax revenue 
must be higher to fund Medicaid reimbursement of these prescriptions at inflated prices, which 
results in higher deadweight loss. This suggests that the DOJ intervention increased welfare, 
rather than just having served as a neutral transfer from pharmacies to the government. Of 
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course, there also are other important margins over which the intervention may have led to 
changes in behavior for manufacturers, pharmacies, payers, and consumers, any of which could 
have affected overall welfare.  A full welfare analysis would require consideration of all of these 
margins, which goes beyond the scope of this paper (and, in some cases, beyond the scope of 
available data), but represents a potentially fruitful area for future research.  Nonetheless, the fact 
that we do find large distortions in behavior resulting from inflated AWP pricing does suggest 
that there likely were substantial negative effects on welfare. Here we provide preliminary 
evidence on the effects of the intervention on three other important margins of adjustment by 
manufacturers and pharmacies—access, total spending, and the introduction and discontinuation 
of NDCs.   
  
5.4.1. Impacts on Access to Prescription Drugs by Medicaid Beneficiaries 
The decline in reimbursement may have reduced access to the targeted drug groups for 
Medicaid beneficiaries.  For example, pharmacies may have responded to the reduced profit 
margins for generic drugs by choosing not to dispense certain targeted drugs to Medicaid 
beneficiaries and manufacturers may have discontinued producing some targeted drugs, reducing 
the availability of treatments overall.   
In Table 7, we provide a preliminary test for these extensive margin effects.  In Column 
1, we estimate Equation 6 using the log of total prescriptions (i.e. the number of prescriptions for 
targeted plus competitor NDCs) in drug group  in year  as the dependent variable. This 
provides suggestive evidence for whether the intervention reduced Medicaid beneficiaries' access 
to DOJ-targeted drug groups. The point estimates of the slope and intercept shift suggests that 
the quantity of total prescriptions did fall by a small amount, but the standard errors are large and 
we cannot conclude that there was a trend break in access to targeted drug groups for Medicaid 
beneficiaries after the intervention. This is consistent with the graphical evidence presented in 
Appendix Figure A.2 (Panel A) which also does not show a clear trend break in total 
prescriptions. 
 
5.4.2. Strategic Product Introduction and Discontinuation 
Next, we consider another supply-side mechanism through which we may observe 
substitution between targeted and competitor drugs following the intervention. Manufacturers of 
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targeted NDCs may have strategically responded to the DOJ targeting by introducing and 
marketing new products with new NDC codes that are close substitutes of their targeted NDCs.  
For example, one way that manufacturers could strategically respond to the intervention is by re-
introducing targeted products with new package sizes. Since the last two digits of the NDC code 
determine the package size, these new products will be assigned new NDCs and would not be 
subject to DOJ pricing recommendations.  Manufacturers could then set new AWPs for these 
NDCs in any way they desire. For the purposes of this analysis, such new products are classified 
as “competitor NDCs.”   
Introducing new products is costly for manufacturers as it requires obtaining necessary 
FDA approvals, shifting production resources, and marketing to generate pharmacy market share 
for the newly re-packaged or re-formulated products.  Even if new products are bioequivalent to 
the targeted versions and there is no impact on the overall availability of drugs for Medicaid 
beneficiaries, proliferation of these newly introduced substitute NDCs may have welfare 
implications. If the prices of the new products are greater than the DOJ-recommended prices of 
their targeted counterparts, the strategic introduction of NDCs undoes some of the potential cost-
savings to the Medicaid program of the policy change and, at the same time, leads to higher 
profit margins for pharmacies and/or manufacturers (and presumably increased deadweight loss 
from increased taxes to fund higher Medicaid reimbursements).  Thus, the overall welfare 
implications arising from a reimbursement policy that leads to strategic product substitution are 
likely to be negative. 
In Table 8, we report the results from specifications that examine whether there were 
strategic entry and exit decisions caused by the DOJ policy.  We note at the outset that our 
empirical “test” is simplistic; a more formal analysis would require simultaneous modeling of 
product entry and exit decisions, consideration of product differentiation at the drug class level, 
and other considerations typical of comprehensive industry studies. Therefore, we consider these 
findings suggestive but not definitive.  
If manufacturers of targeted NDCs strategically introduced new NDCs to replace their 
targeted NDCs, we would observe an uptick in the fraction of new competitor NDCs produced 
by targeted firms in drug groups that had a targeted NDC relative to the fraction of new 
competitor NDCs produced by non-targeted firms.44 To examine whether this occurred, we first 
                                                          
44 This assumes non-targeted firms’ incentives to introduce new NDCs were not affected by the DOJ intervention. 
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calculate for each drug group the stock of competitor NDCs with positive sales that were 
produced by targeted firms and non-targeted firms in an early base year, 1995, well before the 
DOJ intervention, and in a later base year, 1999, right before the DOJ intervention.  We then 
calculate the ratio of the number of new NDC entrants in each drug group45 over the subsequent 
three years (1996-1998 or 2000-2002) divided by the stock of NDCs in the corresponding base 
period.46 We then average these rates of entry in each time period across drug groups for targeted 
and non-targeted firms separately. 
As shown in the first row of Panel A in Table 8, there was an average 47% increase in the 
total number of NDCs produced by targeted firms in the early time period (between 1996 and 
1998) due to entry.  The rate of introduction fell to 12% for the time period between 2000 and 
2002 (relative to the stock in 1999) following the DOJ policy.  This decrease may have arisen for 
many reasons, including natural product life cycles that had nothing to do with the DOJ policy. 
Because of that, in the second row of Panel A, we similarly compute the change in the rate of 
NDC introduction for non-targeted firms, in order to construct a basic difference-in-difference 
estimate of strategic product entry decisions by targeted firms relative to non-targeted firms. As 
shown in the second row, non-targeted firms also slowed their rate of new product entry in these 
drug groups and by an even greater amount, from 86% to 29%. The difference-in-difference 
estimate of 22 percentage points suggests that the rate of introduction increased after the 
intervention for targeted firms relative to non-targeted firms, but it is not statistically 
significant.47 Moreover, the fact that the rates of new product introduction were so different for 
targeted versus competitor firms before the DOJ policy may suggest the potential for differential 
trends, which we have not accounted for here. Nonetheless, we find the large point estimate of 
strategic entry suggestive enough to warrant future research. With respect to policy design, it is 
critical to understand whether a Medicaid policy that targets specific drug products to constrain 
costs causes other distortions to unregulated drug products (i.e. proliferation of new unregulated 
                                                          
45 An NDC is considered an entrant in the first year that they are observed with positive Medicaid sales. 
46 We use the number of NDCs in the two base periods as the denominators, rather than the total number of NDCs 
during the two three-year periods we examine in order to abstract from product exits that could have occurred 
simultaneous to introductions. 
47 Measured in proportional terms the declines were similar and actually slightly larger for targeted firms (74 percent 
versus 67 percent). Indeed, given the baseline entry rate for targeted firms of 47.3 percent, it would not have been 
possible for their entry rates to decline by 56.9 percentage points as they did for competitor firms. 
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versions of targeted products)  in order to mitigate the costs of these constraints (see also Duggan 
and Scott-Morton, 2006).48  
In Panel B of Table 8, we report results from a similar analysis for product exit during the 
periods pre- and post-DOJ policy. The first row of panel B reports that, on average, 7 percent of 
competitor NDCs produced by targeted firms exited prior to the DOJ policy, and that the rate of 
exit increased appreciably, to 17 percent after the policy. The second row of Panel B reports that 
the rate of exit for products produced by competitor firms also increased between the cohorts, 
from 23 percent to 38 percent.  The difference-in-difference estimate suggests that the change in 
the rate of exit was 6 percentage points lower for targeted firms than competitor firms, though 
this result is not statistically significant. The point estimates are consistent with the possibility 
that firms that produced targeted NDCs may have chosen to keep other competitor products in 
the same drug class on the market longer than they would have otherwise, substituting marketing 
and production efforts away from their DOJ-targeted products.49   
While the results of strategic introduction and discontinuation by targeted firms as a 
result of the DOJ policy are not conclusive statistically, we find the point estimates suggestive 
enough to warrant more investigation in future research. 
 
5.4.3. Effects on Total Medicaid Spending 
Finally, we consider preliminary evidence of the net effect of drug product substitution, 
introduction, and discontinuation on total Medicaid reimbursement following the DOJ 
intervention.  In Table 7 (Column 2), we estimate an interrupted time series specification as in 
Equation 6.  The dependent variable is the log of total reimbursement (i.e. the total 
reimbursement for targeted and competitor NDCs) in drug group  in year  and we include 
indicators for intercept and slope shifts, drug group fixed effects, and drug group-specific linear 
trends.  While we cannot rule out other shocks to reimbursement during this time period, there 
was a statistically significant break in the reimbursement trend after the intervention, which is 
also apparent graphically in Appendix Figure A.2 (Panel B).   If this entire change was due to the 
adoption of new DOJ prices, then the intervention would have generated on average a 40% 
                                                          
48 This response is known as “multi-tasking” in other contexts (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) and is likely to be 
an issue for any targeted approach to cost containment.     
49 Targeted firms may have discontinued targeted drugs more frequently or more rapidly than otherwise also as a 
result of the policy.  By definition, no targeted drugs were discontinued prior to 2000, but between 2000 and 2002, 6 
percent were discontinued.  
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 reduction in total Medicaid reimbursement for the drug groups affected 
by the policy.   This effect combines: 1) the mechanical effect of a reduction in reimbursement 
for targeted drugs with 2) substitution towards competitor drugs whose absolute prices were on 
average less than the initial prices paid for targeted drugs even after their prices increased.   
 
6. Conclusion 
Current Medicaid procurement rules generate perverse incentives for pharmacies to 
purchase and stock the highest-priced generic drugs. Consequently, manufacturers of generic 
drugs may compete for pharmacy market share by perversely bidding up the price on which 
Medicaid reimbursement is based. The DOJ recommendations to reduce the AWP for 
approximately 400 drug products provides an opportunity to study the impact of Medicaid 
procurement on generic drug price competition. 
We find that Medicaid reimbursement per prescription declined substantially for targeted 
drugs following the DOJ intervention. In response to this negative price shock, pharmacies 
reduced their demand for targeted drugs and increased their demand for competitor drugs. 
Overall, the Medicaid market share for targeted drugs fell by about 45% through 2004.  We also 
observe a differential decline in price and market share across states, which is consistent with the 
time pattern of adoption of the DOJ recommendations.  Further, we find larger market share 
responses for drug groups in which targeted drugs had higher spreads and larger market share in 
the pre-intervention period as predicted.  Taken together this evidence suggests that pharmacies 
substitute away from low priced generic drugs towards high priced drugs when making 
purchasing decisions. This demand response, while consistent with profit-maximizing behavior, 
is inconsistent with a typical competitive market in which the lowest-priced drugs capture the 
highest market share. This distortion has significant consequences for pharmaceutical spending.   
Finally, we also examine whether the policy-induced reduction in Medicaid 
reimbursement affected Medicaid recipients’ access to prescriptions or other supply side 
responses by manufacturers.  Our results on access to drugs in targeted drug groups are 
inconclusive, but we do find suggestive evidence that manufacturers engaged in strategic product 
introductions and discontinuations that likely mitigated the profit loss induced by the policy.   
The Affordable Care Act will significantly expand Medicaid enrollment and drug 
spending under this program, making the need for well-designed procurement rules that 
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constrain distortionary behaviors and excessive spending even more critical in the near future.  
Despite calls for Medicaid payment reform,50 numerous AWP lawsuits, and several proposed 
changes to drug procurement rules, the AWP is still used as the primary reimbursement 
benchmark in the majority of state Medicaid programs. The persistence of the AWP reflects the 
significant challenges of designing alternative procurement policies that both limit distortions to 
market outcomes and that are feasible to implement.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
50 For example, see “Medicaid Prescription Drug Reimbursement: Why the Government Pays Too Much,” House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 108th Congress (2004). 
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Figure 1- Trends in Reimbursement per Prescription and Prescriptions Purchased, 1991-
2004 
Panel A:  Mean Reimbursement per Prescription for Targeted and Competitor NDCs 
  
Panel B:  Mean Number of Prescriptions for Targeted and Competitor NDCs 
  
Panel C:  Mean Targeted Market Share at the Drug Group Level 
 
Notes:  Figure 1 plots raw means of reimbursement per prescription and number of prescriptions using NDC-level 
data and mean targeted market share using drug group level data. Means for NDCs that were targeted by the DOJ 
and their competitor NDCs are plotted separately. Sample restrictions are described in section 4.2. 
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Figure 2 – Trends in Prescriptions for Competitor NDCs, Targeted Firms vs. Non-Targeted 
Firms 
 
Notes:  Figure 2 plots raw means of the number of prescriptions using NDC-level data for “competitor” NDCs. 
Means are plotted separately for competitor NDCs that were manufactured by firms whose other products in the 
drug group had been targeted by the DOJ with competitor NDCs that were manufactured by firms whose products 
were not at all targeted in the drug group. The sample excludes data from the five states that do not use the AWP as 
their primary reimbursement methodology, hemophilia drugs, and outliers as described in the text in section 4.2. 
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Table 1 – Illustration of Margins between Published AWPs and DOJ-Audited Actual 
Average Wholesale Prices for Select NDCs 
Generic Name NDC Product Description
AWP in 1999 
(Red Book)
DOJ Average 
Wholesale Price
ACETYLCYSTEINE 49502-0182-30 20%, 30 ml, 3s 133.43 50.64
ACYCLOVIR SODIUM 63323-0325-20 50 mg/ml, 20 ml 42.59 28.00
ALBUTEROL SULFATE 49502-0697-60 0.083%, 3 ml, 60s 72.60 22.01
CIMETIDINE HYDROCHLORIDE 00074-7444-01 150 mg/ml, 2 ml, 10s 86.69 11.72
CLINDAMYCIN PHOSPHATE 00009-0728-09 150 mg/ml, 60 ml, 5s 905.88 259.20
FUROSEMIDE 00074-6102-04 10 mg/ml, 4 ml, 25s 122.02 20.28
LORAZEPAM 00074-1985-10 2 mg/ml, 10 ml 86.81 25.83
LUPRON 00300-3629-01 7.5 mg, ea (PDS) 594.65 482.52
VANCOMYCIN HYDROCHLORIDE 00205-3154-15 1 gm, 10s, ea 109.39 9.02
ZOFRAN 00173-0461-00 32 mg/50 ml, 50 ml 206.41 128.09  
 
Notes:  The source for the AWP is the 1999 Red Book; the source for the actual average wholesale price uncovered 
in the DOJ audit is obtained from a Program Memorandum issued by the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS, 2000).  For each generic or off-patent drug shown in the table, the NDC selected represents approximately 
the median spread (ratio of Red Book AWP to DOJ average wholesale price) for that drug group.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics, 1999-2002 
Targeted NDCs
All
Targeted 
Firms
Non-Targeted 
Firms
Sample: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Reimbursement per Prescription, 1999 232.61 73.86 166.67 50.49
Change in Reimbursement per Prescription, 1999-2002 -42.13 10.72 -16.66 12.73
Number of Prescriptions, 1999 7,994.12 6,699.91 7,288.44 6,551.67
Change in Number of Prescriptions, 1999-2002 -358.17 2,803.16 37.15 3,662.51
NDC Market Share, 1999 0.050 0.009 0.011 0.009
Change in NDC Market Share, 1999-2002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
Drug Group Market Share, 1999* 0.409 0.635 0.188 0.566
Change in Drug Group Market Share, 1999-2002 -0.011 -0.018 0.004 -0.032
Fraction Generic, 1999 0.670 0.787 0.639 0.841
Year of FDA Approval, 1999 1991.3 1989.6 1990.7 1989.2
Fraction Unit Type, 1999:
ML 0.737 0.466 0.763 0.358
Gram 0.024 0.046 0.029 0.053
Capsule 0.000 0.023 0.016 0.025
Tablet 0.000 0.374 0.110 0.470
Other 0.239 0.091 0.082 0.094
Total Prescriptions, 1999 2,869,890 18,980,848 4,154,410 14,826,438
Total Reimbursement, 1999 155,787,680 389,058,079 107,581,483 281,476,595
NDC x Year Observations, 1999 359 2,833 570 2,263
Competitor NDCs
 
Notes:  Variable means are reported using NDC-level data with the exception of drug group market share*, which 
uses drug group-level data. The sample excludes data from the five states that do not use the AWP as their primary 
reimbursement methodology, hemophilia drugs, and outliers as described in the text in section 4.2. 
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Table 3— Effects of DOJ Intervention on Reimbursement per Prescription, 1994-2004  
Dependent variable: 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Target*Post*(t-2000) -0.071* -0.092** -0.110**
(0.041) (0.038) (0.047)
Target*Post -0.292*** -0.325*** -0.343***
(0.055) (0.052) (0.061)
Target*Year1994 0.109
(0.139)
Target*Year1995 0.025
(0.120)
Target*Year1996 0.100
(0.122)
Target*Year1997 0.127
(0.107)
Target*Year1998 0.059
(0.048)
Target*Year2000 -0.175***
(0.039)
Target*Year2001 -0.421***
(0.076)
Target*Year2002 -0.525***
(0.087)
Target*Year2003 -0.543***
(0.088)
Target*Year2004 -0.528***
(0.090)
Year FE Y Y Y Y
NDC FE Y Y Y Y
Drug Group x Target x t N N Y Y
Excl. Targeted Firms N N N Y
F-test 11.390
[0.000]
NDC x Year Obs 32,203 32,203 32,203 26,899
Log (Reimbursement per Prescription)
 
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors at the drug group level. Column 1 reports results 
from estimating equation 2 using NDC-level data and Columns 2-4 report results from estimating equation 3 and 4. 
Column 2 also includes a linear time trend interacted with Target which is not reported. Column 3 adds Drug Group 
x Target specific linear trends, and Column 4 excludes observations from “competitor” NDCs manufactured by 
targeted firms. The F-test tests the joint significance of Target*Year2000 through Target*Year2004 (p-value in 
brackets). Sample restrictions are described in section 4.2. 
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Table 4 – Effects of DOJ Intervention on Prescriptions Purchased, 1994-2004 
Dependent variable: 
Targeted 
Firms
Non-Targeted 
Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post*(t-2000) -0.036** -0.037** 0.002 0.035**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.010) (0.016)
Post -0.04 -0.04 0.022 0.019
(0.027) (0.029) (0.018) (0.024)
Year1994 -0.110**
(0.050)
Year1995 -0.080*
(0.046)
Year1996 -0.052
(0.041)
Year1997 -0.014
(0.027)
Year1998 -0.001
(0.023)
Year2000 -0.006
(0.017)
Year2001 -0.015
(0.023)
Year2002 -0.011
(0.028)
Year2003 -0.039
(0.033)
Year2004 -0.058
(0.041)
Drug Group FE Y Y Y Y Y
Drug Group x t N N Y Y Y
F-test 2.230
[0.068]
Mean Dependent 
Variable (1999) 0.409 0.141 0.450
Observations 480 480 480 480 480
Targeted Market Share Competitor Market Share
 
 
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors at the drug group level. Column 1 reports results 
from estimating equation 5 using drug group-level data and Columns 2 and 3 report results from estimating equation 
6. Column 2 is estimated at the drug group level and includes a linear time trend whose coefficient is not reported. 
Column 3 adds drug group specific linear trends. Columns 4 and 5 report results using the market share of 
competitor drugs (for targeted firms or non-targeted firms) as the dependent variable. The F-test tests the joint 
significance of Year2000 through Year2004 (p-value in brackets). Sample restrictions are described in section 4.2. 
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Table 5 – Early Adopter States versus All Other States 
 
Dependent variable: 
Early Adopter 
States
All Other 
States
Early Adopter 
States
All Other 
States
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Target*Year1994 0.124 -0.018 Year1994 -0.117** -0.095*
(0.140) (0.148) (0.051) (0.050)
Target*Year1995 0.089 -0.039 Year1995 -0.084* -0.071
(0.128) (0.148) (0.047) (0.047)
Target*Year1996 0.101 0.024 Year1996 -0.056 -0.042
(0.127) (0.134) (0.041) (0.042)
Target*Year1997 0.128 0.081 Year1997 -0.018 -0.015
(0.105) (0.125) (0.027) (0.032)
Target*Year1998 0.047 0.008 Year1998 -0.007 0.01
(0.043) (0.063) (0.021) (0.025)
Target*Year2000 -0.310*** -0.099** Year2000 -0.021 0.008
(0.060) (0.046) (0.021) (0.017)
Target*Year2001 -0.660*** -0.215*** Year2001 -0.039 0.021
(0.112) (0.057) (0.026) (0.024)
Target*Year2002 -0.630*** -0.437*** Year2002 -0.047 0.033
(0.111) (0.090) (0.031) (0.030)
Target*Year2003 -0.583*** -0.484*** Year2003 -0.062* -0.011
(0.099) (0.102) (0.034) (0.039)
Target*Year2004 -0.548*** -0.507*** Year2004 -0.088** -0.025
(0.100) (0.108) (0.040) (0.046)
Year FE Y Y Drug Group FE Y Y
NDC FE Y Y Drug Group x t N N
Drug Group x Target x t N N
F-test 7.800 10.420 F-test 1.460 1.980
[0.000] [0.000] [0.223] [0.101]
NDC x Year Obs 29,038 29,254 Drug Group x Year Obs 480 480
Log (Reimbursement per 
Prescription) Targeted Market Share
 
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors at the drug group level. Columns 1 and 3 report 
non-parametric results from the 30 states that reported in an OIG survey that they had incorporated AWP changes as 
of January-March 2001.  Columns 2 and 3 report results for all other states. Sample restrictions are described in 
section 4.2. 
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Table 6 – Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Target*Post*(t-2000) -0.092**-0.101*** -0.102*** -0.113*** -0.09 -0.102* -0.105** -0.119**
(0.035) (0.030) (0.033) (0.032) (0.059) (0.057) (0.048) (0.043)
Target*Post -0.325***-0.288*** -0.387*** -0.387*** -0.114* -0.07 -0.324*** -0.276**
(0.048) (0.055) (0.049) (0.060) (0.066) (0.091) (0.092) (0.102)
Target*Post*(t-2000)*I(>Median) 0.016 0.017 -0.003 0.000 0.026 0.036
(0.041) (0.045) (0.055) (0.062) (0.041) (0.044)
Target*Post*I(>Median) 0.106 0.148 -0.294*** -0.305*** 0.000 -0.021
(0.100) (0.114) (0.079) (0.100) (0.106) (0.124)
Trimmed (Excl. Targeted Mkt Share 
<5% & >95%) N Y N Y N Y N Y
NDC x Year Obs 32,203 15,758 32,203 15,758 32,060 15,725 32,203 15,758
Panel B:  Targeted Market Share
Post*(t-2000) -0.037** -0.040** 0.004 0.006 -0.031 -0.014 -0.045 -0.032
(0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.031)
Post -0.04 -0.046 0.011 0.009 -0.05 -0.033 -0.078 -0.075
(0.029) (0.039) (0.028) (0.051) (0.046) (0.053) (0.052) (0.061)
Post*(t-2000)*I(>Median) -0.084*** -0.077** -0.02 -0.069* 0.015 -0.02
(0.026) (0.035) (0.030) (0.034) (0.030) (0.034)
Post*I(>Median) -0.106* -0.091 0.025 -0.006 0.074 0.068
(0.055) (0.074) (0.057) (0.077) (0.056) (0.072)
Trimmed (Excl. Targeted Mkt Share 
<5% & >95%) N Y N Y N Y N Y
Drug Group x Year Obs 480 330 480 330 458 319 480 330
<=Median: 0.10 2.21 2.95
>Median: 0.71 27.43 24.41
Mean Targeted Mkt 
Share (1999)
Mean Targeted 
Spread (1999)
Mean No. of Firms 
(1999)
Baseline
Panel A:  Log (Reimbursement per Prescription)
Targeted Market Share 
in Drug Group (1999)
Targeted Spread in 
Drug Group (1999)
Number of Firms in 
Drug Group (1999)
 
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Clustered standard errors at the drug group level.  Panel A includes drug 
group fixed effects, year fixed effects, and drug group x target linear trends.  Panel B includes drug group fixed 
effects and drug group specific linear trends. Columns 1 and 2 are copied from Tables 3 and 4.  Columns 3-8 interact 
the slope and intercept terms of the baseline specification with an indicator for drug group characteristics: 1) 
whether the drug group had above median targeted market share in 1999 (Cols 3 and 4), 2) whether the drug group 
had above median average spread for targeted drugs in 1999 (Cols 5 and 6), 3) whether the drug group had above 
median number of competitor firms in 1999 (Cols 7 and 8).  Sample restrictions are described in section 4.2.  
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Table 7 – Effect on Access to Prescription Drugs and Total Spending 
Dependent Variable: Log (Total Prescriptions) Log (Total Reimbursement)
(1) (2)
Post*(t-2000) -0.034 -0.124**
(0.035) (0.051)
Post -0.007 -0.008
(0.061) (0.122)
Drug Group FE Y Y
Drug Group x t Y Y
Observations 480 480  
 
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors at the drug group level.  Sample restrictions are 
described in section 4.2. 
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Table 8 –  Effects on Introduction and Discontinuation of Competitor NDCs, Targeted 
Firms vs. Non-Targeted Firms 
 
Pre-DOJ 
Intervention
Post-DOJ 
Intervention Difference
Sample: Competitor NDCs (1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Rate of NDC Introduction
Targeted Firms 0.473 0.123 -0.350*
(0.207) (0.036) (0.207)
Non-Targeted Firms 0.856 0.287 -0.569*
(0.307) (0.065) (0.302)
Difference-in-Difference 0.219
(0.366)
Panel B: Rate of NDC Discontinuation
Targeted Firms 0.072 0.166 0.094**
(0.025) (0.042) (0.046)
Non-Targeted Firms 0.233 0.384 0.150*
(0.052) (0.066) (0.083)
Difference-in-Difference -0.056
(0.091)  
 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors at the drug-group level.  Each observation in the 
regression is a drug group x targeted firm cell.  For the introduction results (Panel A), each cell in Column 1 reports 
the average (across drug groups) of the ratio of the number of NDCs in each drug group that entered in 1996-1998 
(pre-DOJ intervention) divided by the number of NDCs with positive sales in the drug group in 1995 (separately for 
NDCs produced by targeted and non-targeted firms).  Column 2 reports the average ratio of the number of NDCs in 
a drug group that entered in 2000-2000 divided by the baseline stock, using 1999 as the base year. The 
discontinuation results (Panel B) are reported similarly. Sample restrictions are described in section 4.2. N=131. 
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Appendix A 
 
Figure A.1 – Illustration of DOJ Intervention for Acetylcysteine  
 
Drug Group: Acetylcysteine 
NDC Product Description Manufacturer Targeted by DOJ?
00074-3307-01 ACETYLCYSTEINE 10% VIAL Abbott (generic) N
00074-3307-02 ACETYLCYSTEINE 10% VIAL Abbott (generic) N
00074-3307-03 ACETYLCYSTEINE 10% VIAL Abbott (generic) Y
00074-3308-01 ACETYLCYSTEINE 20% VIAL Abbott (generic) N
00074-3308-02 ACETYLCYSTEINE 20% VIAL Abbott (generic) N
00074-3308-03 ACETYLCYSTEINE 20% VIAL Abbott (generic) Y
55390-0211-03 ACETYLCYSTEINE 10% VIAL Bedford (generic) N
55390-0212-03 ACETYLCYSTEINE 10% VIAL Bedford (generic) N
55390-0213-03 ACETYLCYSTEINE 20% VIAL Bedford (generic) N
55390-0214-03 ACETYLCYSTEINE 20% VIAL Bedford (generic) N
61703-0203-04 ACETYLCYSTEINE 10% VIAL Faulding (generic) Y
61703-0203-31 ACETYLCYSTEINE 10% VIAL Faulding (generic) Y
61703-0204-04 ACETYLCYSTEINE 20% VIAL Faulding (generic) Y
61703-0204-31 ACETYLCYSTEINE 20% VIAL Faulding (generic) Y
And Other NDCs…  
 
 
Notes:  This figure illustrates the DOJ intervention described in Section 3.1 for selected NDCs within the drug group 
Acetylcysteine.  Only a few NDCs produced by Abbott were targeted by the DOJ, all NDCs produced by Faulding 
were targeted, and no NDCs produced by Bedford were targeted.  The DOJ recommended that states lower 
Medicaid reimbursement from the AWP to the audited price for targeted NDCs within the group of bioequivalent 
NDCs. Following the intervention, the market share for the Acetylcysteine NDCs targeted by the DOJ declined 
sharply.  Approximately 50 drug groups had at least one NDC targeted by the DOJ, with about 400 NDCs targeted 
overall. 
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Figure A.2 – Trends in Access to Prescription Drugs and Total Spending for Targeted 
Drug Groups, 1991-2004 
 
Panel A: Log Total Prescriptions 
9.
8
10
10
.2
10
.4
10
.6
Lo
g(
To
ta
l P
re
sc
rip
tio
ns
)
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
year
Targeted Drug Groups
 
 
Panel B: Log Total Reimbursement 
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Notes: This figure plots raw means of log total number of prescriptions and log total reimbursement using drug 
group level data. This is the graphical analog to the regressions in Table 7.  Sample restrictions are described in 
section 4.2. 
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Table A.1 – Descriptive Statistics for Generic Drug Groups Targeted by the DOJ, 
1999
Generic Drug Group
Targeted by 
DOJ?
Mean 
Reimbursement 
per Prescription
Total Medicaid 
Reimbursement 
Amount ($1000s)
Total Number of 
Prescriptions
Total Reimbursement 
Amount for Drug 
Group ($1000s)
ALBUTEROL SULFATE N 17.4 87,179 5,560,183 146,139
ALBUTEROL SULFATE Y 32.2 58,960 1,976,543 146,139
FACTOR VIII N 13036.1 951 40 97,551
FACTOR VIII Y 10493.2 96,600 9,697 97,551
LORAZEPAM N 36.0 79,891 2,468,956 81,076
LORAZEPAM Y 76.9 1,185 26,785 81,076
FUROSEMIDE N 8.4 33,289 6,188,582 33,478
FUROSEMIDE Y 19.8 190 8,977 33,478
SODIUM CHLORIDE N 35.0 17,917 650,140 27,337
SODIUM CHLORIDE Y 72.3 9,421 141,677 27,337
CROMOLYN SODIUM N 53.0 14,172 227,836 25,917
CROMOLYN SODIUM Y 55.2 11,746 225,219 25,917
ZOFRAN N 416.9 20,641 45,407 24,882
ZOFRAN Y 331.8 4,240 30,931 24,882
IMMUNE GLOBULIN N 1323.3 2,335 4,179 24,284
IMMUNE GLOBULIN Y 1981.5 21,949 10,743 24,284
FACTOR IX Y 10159.7 18,621 1,744 18,621
TOBRAMYCIN SULFATE N 189.2 17,132 172,124 18,081
TOBRAMYCIN SULFATE Y 261.7 949 3,707 18,081
ACYCLOVIR SODIUM N 75.4 16,681 366,494 16,957
ACYCLOVIR SODIUM Y 734.3 277 1,161 16,957
LUPRON N 1209.6 7,153 9,819 15,871
LUPRON Y 1160.1 8,718 12,380 15,871
CLINDAMYCIN PHOSPHATE N 53.5 13,040 324,187 13,462
CLINDAMYCIN PHOSPHATE Y 150.7 422 3,337 13,462
VANCOMYCIN HYDROCHLORIDE N 184.4 3,474 16,676 13,365
VANCOMYCIN HYDROCHLORIDE Y 194.3 9,892 45,095 13,365
CIMETIDINE HYDROCHLORIDE N 21.2 11,690 664,202 11,706
CIMETIDINE HYDROCHLORIDE Y 45.6 16 521 11,706
DIAZEPAM N 24.2 11,119 1,083,068 11,141
DIAZEPAM Y 15.2 22 1,331 11,141
CALCITRIOL N 97.4 8,906 136,094 9,263
CALCITRIOL Y 290.1 358 24,056 9,263
METHOTREXATE SODIUM N 38.2 9,014 173,751 9,261
METHOTREXATE SODIUM Y 17.4 247 20,216 9,261
KYTRIL N 606.3 4,206 7,812 6,780
KYTRIL Y 786.5 2,575 12,653 6,780
DEXTROSE N 57.6 483 9,476 6,246
DEXTROSE Y 70.2 5,764 105,501 6,246
AMPHOTERICIN B N 839.2 5,253 5,400 6,027
AMPHOTERICIN B Y 120.6 774 2,634 6,027
HEPARIN LOCK FLUSH N 39.7 3,665 139,014 4,506
HEPARIN LOCK FLUSH Y 15.1 841 62,470 4,506
METAPROTERENOL SULFATE N 26.7 3,365 134,173 4,181
METAPROTERENOL SULFATE Y 55.1 816 12,522 4,181
GENTAMICIN SULFATE N 17.6 3,639 340,752 3,737
GENTAMICIN SULFATE Y 28.0 98 4,477 3,737
WINRHO SDF Y 2080.4 3,696 3,162 3,696
LEUCOVORIN CALCIUM N 166.3 2,536 21,744 3,256
LEUCOVORIN CALCIUM Y 322.1 720 3,039 3,256
ANZEMET/DOLASETRON MESYLATE N 658.8 779 1,349 3,007
ANZEMET/DOLASETRON MESYLATE Y 341.4 2,227 49,613 3,007
CYCLOPHOSPHAMIDE N 123.8 1,348 8,444 2,690
CYCLOPHOSPHAMIDE Y 930.0 1,342 4,092 2,690
DOXORUBICIN HYDROCHLORIDE N 703.1 721 703 2,461
DOXORUBICIN HYDROCHLORIDE Y 356.0 1,740 4,641 2,461  
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Generic Drug Group
Targeted by 
DOJ?
Mean 
Reimbursement 
per Prescription
Total Medicaid 
Reimbursement 
Amount ($1000s)
Total Number of 
Prescriptions
Total Reimbursement 
Amount for Drug 
Group ($1000s)
ACETYLCYSTEINE N 72.5 874 12,852 2,081
ACETYLCYSTEINE Y 76.9 1,207 15,538 2,081
ETOPOSIDE N 617.7 1,725 2,488 2,074
ETOPOSIDE Y 326.5 349 1,064 2,074
DEXAMETHASONE N 14.6 2,025 144,932 2,063
DEXAMETHASONE Y 15.0 38 2,731 2,063
IRON DEXTRAN N 127.4 317 2,614 1,898
IRON DEXTRAN Y 165.1 1,581 11,768 1,898
CISPLATIN N 614.0 1,160 1,976 1,160
CISPLATIN Y 720.8 1 1 1,160
AMIKACIN SULFATE N 329.2 288 739 1,146
AMIKACIN SULFATE Y 389.1 859 3,100 1,146
FLUOROURACIL N 61.5 1,090 15,166 1,139
FLUOROURACIL Y 27.5 50 3,338 1,139
METHYLPREDNISOLONE SODIUM SUCCINATE N 32.6 640 23,669 1,064
METHYLPREDNISOLONE SODIUM SUCCINATE Y 51.8 424 9,749 1,064
TESTOSTERONE CYPIONATE N 41.3 51 1,286 938
TESTOSTERONE CYPIONATE Y 50.6 887 15,208 938
PENTAMIDINE ISETHIONATE N 165.4 629 5,647 816
PENTAMIDINE ISETHIONATE Y 203.4 188 1,099 816
ANTI-INHIBITOR COAGULANT COMPLEX N 9135.9 62 12 743
ANTI-INHIBITOR COAGULANT COMPLEX Y 16368.5 680 51 743
BLEOMYCIN SULFATE Y 713.5 684 791 684
TESTOSTERONE ENANTHATE N 57.0 438 6,268 452
TESTOSTERONE ENANTHATE Y 27.8 14 503 452
VINCRISTINE SULFATE N 77.8 48 644 150
VINCRISTINE SULFATE Y 59.8 101 1,887 150
MITOMYCIN N 430.8 103 163 148
MITOMYCIN Y 535.0 45 93 148
HYDROCORTISONE SODIUM SUCCINATE N 23.3 35 1,668 99
HYDROCORTISONE SODIUM SUCCINATE Y 23.8 65 3,281 99
CYTARABINE Y 95.7 76 1,188 76
VINBLASTINE SULFATE N 135.6 12 171 48
VINBLASTINE SULFATE Y 51.3 36 1,068 48  
Notes: The sample excludes data from the five states that do not use the AWP as their primary reimbursement 
methodology and outliers as described in the text in section 4.2. 
 
 
 
